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ADVANCING POSITIVE WATER RIGHTS
ALLYSON E. GOLD, SRINIVAS PARINANDI, ALLEN SLATER & TYLER
GARRETT*
Despite its necessity to survival, the United States does not recognize a
positive right to water. Instead, access is determined largely by the free
market. Consequently, millions have historically lacked reliable access to
clean water, a crisis that disproportionately affects minority and low-income
households. Then came the COVID-19 pandemic. Record unemployment
resulting from pandemic shutdowns pushed millions more to their financial
breaking points, risking water utility shutoffs at a time when hand hygiene
was critical to slow the spread of the virus. Exercising their police powers,
thirty-three jurisdictions enacted disconnection moratoria, preventing water
utility providers from terminating service even if a consumer was unable to
pay. By forcing redistribution of private property, states disrupted existing
contracts between consumers, water utility providers, and public utility
commissions, raising complex constitutional questions.
This Article is the first to empirically examine water utility
disconnection moratoria enacted in response to COVID-19. This analysis
seeks to identify the conditions favorable for the United States to advance a
positive right to water, even after the pandemic ends. Estimating a
multivariate regression model, this Article finds that the higher a state’s
unemployment rate, the more likely the state was to adopt a moratorium,
suggesting that mitigating the effects of rising unemployment motivates state
action. Following the analysis, the Article evaluates the applicability of the
Fifth Amendment and the Contract Clause to determine the constitutional
contours of a positive right to water. Finally, the Article assesses and
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suggests improvements to current American water policies to expand water
access without exceeding constitutional limitations.
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INTRODUCTION
In April 2013, government officials in Flint, Michigan, entered into an
agreement to stop purchasing water from the city of Detroit, hoping to save
millions of dollars by pumping water directly from Lake Huron instead.1
Though the Lake Huron project would take three years to complete, Detroit
decided to discontinue its services to Flint after only one year.2 In 2014, Flint
started to use water from the Flint River as its main water source until the
Lake Huron pipeline was completed.3 Later that year, residents noted a
decrease in the quality of their tap water, but their complaints were dismissed
by city officials.4 Shortly afterward, the city issued a boil advisory for water

1. Lisa Riordan Seville, Hannah Rappleye & Tracy Connor, Bad Decisions, Broken Promises:
A Timeline of the Flint Water Crisis, NBC NEWS (Jan. 19, 2016, 2:13 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/bad-decisions-broken-promises-timeline-flint-watercrisis-n499641.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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in parts of Flint due to the presence of E. coli bacteria.5 By the end of the
year, residents of Flint were drinking water that had been previously deemed
inadequate for car manufacturing because of its detrimental effect on vehicle
components.6 Over the course of the next year, residents were repeatedly
told that everything was fine, even as they reported discolored and foulsmelling water, skin rashes, and hair loss.7 The people of Flint, and the world,
would eventually learn that through substandard infrastructure and a cascade
of poor and corrupt decisions—like failing to treat the Flint River water with
anti-corrosives—the local and state governments exposed the people of Flint
to toxic lead contamination and disease through their water supply, causing
lifelong health problems,8 and in severe cases, death.9 Even worse, because
state officials used flawed testing and knowingly falsified testing records, the
danger of Flint’s water supply was concealed from residents.10 Government
failure to affirmatively provide clean water literally poisoned a generation of
an American city’s residents.11
Nearly 900 miles south of Flint, the predominantly low-income and
Black population of Lowndes County, Alabama, lives with daily exposure to
raw sewage.12 The county—rural, sparsely populated land between Selma

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also UNIFIED COORDINATION GRP., FLINT RASH INVESTIGATION, 14, 23, 37
(2016), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/events/Flint/Documents/rash-report.pdf.
8. Samantha Raphelson, Flint Residents Confront Long-Term Health Issues After Lead
Exposure, NPR (Oct. 31, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/31/561155244/flintresidents-confront-long-term-health-issues-after-lead-exposure.
9. The deaths are tied to Legionnaire’s disease, a severe form of pneumonia caused by
waterborne bacteria, and researchers assert that the actual death toll is much higher than the state’s
official claim. See Kim Bellware, There May Have Been Dozens More Deaths Linked to the Flint
Water
Crisis
Than
Previously
Known,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
12,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/09/12/there-may-have-been-dozens-more-deathslinked-flint-water-crisis-than-previously-disclosed/. The state’s official count claims that over the
course of an eighteen-month outbreak, twelve people died. Id. However, journalists who reinvestigated medical records from the outbreak assert that over one hundred deaths from
Legionnaire’s disease may have gone uncounted. Id.
10. Josh Keller & Derek Watkins, How Officials Distorted Flint’s Water Testing, N.Y. TIMES
(July 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/21/us/flint-lead-water-testingdistortions.html.
11. Raphelson, supra note 8; see also Mona Hanna-Attisha et al., Elevated Blood Lead Levels
in Children Associated with the Flint Drinking Water Crisis: A Spatial Analysis of Risk and Public
Health Response, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 283, 285 (2016); Nicole Carroll, Lead Was Poisoning
the Water in Flint, Mich. Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha Put Her Reputation on the Line to Prove It.,
USA TODAY (Aug. 27, 2020, 12:26 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/life/women-of-thecentury/2020/08/11/19th-amendment-flint-water-crisis-elevated-dr-mona-hannaattisha/5535823002/.
12. Alexis Okeowo, The Heavy Toll of the Black Belt’s Wastewater Crisis, NEW YORKER (Nov.
23, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/30/the-heavy-toll-of-the-black-beltswastewater-crisis; Inga T. Winkler & Catherine Coleman Flowers, “America’s Dirty Secret”: The
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and Montgomery—is located in Alabama’s Black Belt, named for its dark
and fertile clay soil.13 While ideal for agriculture,14 water cannot easily
percolate through clay, meaning that the Black Belt’s soil has poor
drainage.15 In Lowndes County, poor drainage, combined with a lack of
wastewater infrastructure, has led to a public health disaster. When it rains,
the available wastewater systems send sewage back up the pipes into
residents’ homes or onto their lawns, where it pools, unable to drain.16 One
resident was cautioned not to let her children play in their own yard because
of wastewater contamination.17 Due to a combination of factors, including
state law and local ordinances, poverty, and geography, the residents of
Lowndes County and many other rural communities are responsible for the
installation and maintenance of their own sewage disposal systems.18 A
survey by ACRE, a non-profit organization that advocates for Black Belt
Alabamians, reported that approximately half of the households in Lowndes
County have failing or nonexistent sewage systems.19 A recent medical study
found that more than thirty percent of Lowndes County’s population suffered
from infection by gastrointestinal parasites,20 owing in part to the lack of
adequate wastewater infrastructure.21 Worse still, because individuals, rather
than the government, are responsible for providing water sanitation services
in Lowndes County, these residents have no legal remedy and no one to look
to for help.22 Quite the opposite in fact; Alabama’s government has jailed
and fined Lowndes County residents for failing to provide adequate
sanitation.23 Both Flint and Lowndes County demonstrate the devastating
consequences that can occur absent a positive right to water, which is an
affirmative government commitment to universal clean water access.
Reliable access to clean water has a demonstrable impact on health
outcomes and disease mitigation. Broad access to clean water has been a
Human Right to Sanitation in Alabama’s Black Belt, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 181, 182
(2017).
13. Winkler & Coleman Flowers, supra note 12, at 185.
14. Audrey Gamble, Alabama Soils: Blackland Prairie, EXTENSION: ALA. A&M & AUBURN
UNIVS. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.aces.edu/blog/topics/healthy-soils/alabama-soils-blacklandprairie/.
15. Id.
16. Ashley Cleek, Filthy Water and Shoddy Sewers Plague Poor Black Belt Counties, AL
JAZEERA AM. (June 3, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/3/filthy-waterand-poor-sewers-plague-poor-black-belt-counties.html.
17. Id.
18. Winkler & Coleman Flowers, supra note 12, at 187–88.
19. Megan L. McKenna et al., Human Intestinal Parasite Burden and Poor Sanitation in Rural
Alabama, 97 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. HYGIENE 1623, 1624 (2017).
20. Id. at 1627.
21. Id. at 1625.
22. Winkler & Coleman Flowers, supra note 12, at 188–89.
23. Id. at 191–92.
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critical public health measure in global disease management efforts.24 In
recognition of the water-health nexus, the United Nations has advocated for
a positive human right to water, urging governments to, at minimum, create
structures that enable universal access to clean water.25 Through domestic
courts, international resolutions, and public-private partnerships, several
nations have moved toward expanding water access as a human right.26 The
United States, in contrast, neither espouses a human right to water at the
federal level nor attempts to provide water access, contributing to water crises
like those in Flint and Lowndes County.
The coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic presented an opportunity for
American policymakers to employ a different approach to the right to water,
placing a new emphasis on the importance of water access. The pandemic
pointedly “reveals why household water for drinking and basic hygiene is not
only critical for ‘life,’ but also necessary to achieving one of the
Constitution’s fundamental goals, the nation’s ‘general Welfare.’”27 When
the pandemic started in March 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) and the World Health Organization (“WHO”)
recommended that all persons, with or without COVID-19 symptoms, wash
their hands regularly with soap and water.28 Of course, without reliable
access to clean water, this is an impossibility. Even prior to the pandemic,
more than two million people in the United States lacked “basic access to
safe drinking water and sanitation.”29
Moreover, because many Americans must pay for access to water, the
explosion of unemployment caused by the pandemic—with rates reaching

24. See, e.g., Paul Christopher Webster, Lack of Clean Water Exacerbates Cholera Outbreak
in Haiti, 183 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 83, 83 (2011); Junaid Zahid, Impact of Clean Drinking Water and
Sanitation on Water Borne Diseases in Pakistan, SUSTAINABLE DEV. POL’Y INST. (2018),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17223.
25. G.A.
Res.
70/1,
at
18–19
(Oct.
21,
2015),
https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1.
26. See e.g., infra notes 48–50, 89–90, 92 and accompanying text.
27. Martha F. Davis, Freedom from Thirst: A Right to Basic Household Water, 42 CARDOZO
L. REV. 879, 882 (2021) (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
28. How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html#print
(last
visited Jan. 31, 2022); Hand Hygiene: Why, How & When?, WHO (Aug. 2009),
https://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/Hand_Hygiene_Why_How_and_When_Brochure.pdf.
29. Zoë Roller et al., Closing the Water Access Gap in the United States: A National Action
Plan,
U.S.
WATER
ALL.
12
(Nov.
2019),
http://uswateralliance.org/sites/uswateralliance.org/files/Closing%20the%20Water%20Access%2
0Gap%20in%20the%20United%20States_DIGITAL.pdf (“This number includes: 1.4 million
people in the United States [who] lack access to indoor plumbing (hot and cold running water, a
sink, a shower/bath, or a flush toilet); 250,000 people in Puerto Rico; [and] 553,000 homeless people
in the United States who may lack equitable water and sanitation access.”).
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levels not seen since the Great Depression30—threatened many Americans’
ability to pay for continued water access. At a time when “the provision of
clean water to residences [was] essential to human health and hygiene, and
to the public health and safety,”31 a record number of people were at risk of
losing access to water because they could not afford it. Furthermore, many
of the communities that lack water access and who became unemployed are
also disproportionately vulnerable to COVID-19.32 Rarely has the
connection between water and life been more concrete: The COVID-19
pandemic has, as of this writing, resulted in at least 900,000 deaths in the
United States.33
In response to the pandemic’s economic effects, and in an effort to slow
virus transmission, thirty-three jurisdictions around the country enacted
water utility disconnection moratoria.34 Relying on states’ heightened police
powers during a state of emergency,35 these jurisdictions adopted regulations
preventing utility companies from disconnecting water services even if a
consumer could not afford to pay, approaching constitutional limits of forced
redistribution of private property. The obligation of a utility company to
continue to provide water services, even if it resulted in financial loss, raises
important constitutional and empirical questions: (1) Under what legal
authority can states enact a de facto positive right to water; (2) even if acting
with authority, must states pay compensation to water utility providers; and
(3) what factors influence that decision?
Analyzing COVID-19 water utility disconnection moratorium data, this
Article investigates the conditions that galvanize state governments to
advance positive water rights, and proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses the
right to water, exploring the dichotomy between positive and negative rights
approaches to water access and distribution. This Part examines how the
crisis presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying recession
upended the United States’ historic negative rights approach by motivating
30. GENE FALK ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46554, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES DURING THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.pdf.
31. Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-28 (Mar. 30, 2020), repealed by Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020144 (July 8, 2020).
32. Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/healthequity/race-ethnicity.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2022).
33. Johns Hopkins Univ., COVID-19 Dashboard, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2021).
34. The remaining states did not enact statewide moratoria. In some instances, individual utility
providers in these jurisdictions chose on their own to suspend disconnection. As this is a company
decision, it can be reversed at any time.
35. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348 (1917) (“[A]lthough an emergency may not call into life
a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a
living power already enjoyed.”).
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the majority of states to adopt water utility disconnection moratoria. Part II
presents original data collection and empirical analysis of utility
disconnection moratoria enacted after the WHO declared COVID-19 a
pandemic on March 11, 2020. Using statistical analysis, this Part assesses
several factors—including state unemployment rate, per capita income,
diversity, and percent of the population that voted for Donald Trump in 2016,
among others—that may have an effect on whether a jurisdiction adopted a
water utility disconnection moratorium. In doing so, this Part identifies the
reasoning that most strongly influenced policymakers.
Part III evaluates the constitutional limitations on a positive right to
water. This Part begins by defining water property rights. Next, Part III
assesses the applicability of two distinct frameworks—regulatory takings and
confiscatory utility rate setting—to determine what, if any, obligations a state
has to compensate utility companies for losses incurred through compliance
with disconnection moratoria. This Part also discusses whether advancing
positive water rights through disconnection moratoria violates Article I’s
prohibition on contract impairment, considering both the effect on the
contract between water utility providers and consumers as well as the
relationship between providers and public utility commissions. Part IV
concludes that disconnection moratoria neither effect a Fifth Amendment
taking nor violate the Contract Clause and proposes additional measures for
policymakers to adopt to advance a positive right to water even after the
pandemic ends.
I. THE RIGHT TO WATER
“A safe, reliable, affordable, and easily accessible water supply is
essential for good health.”36 At the most basic level, an individual needs
access to at least 7.5 liters of water in the home each day for drinking, food
preparation, and personal hygiene.37 Ideally, everyone would have access to
a minimum of one hundred liters of water each day to ensure that all
consumption, hygiene, and laundering needs could be met.38 Six factors
determine whether a water supply is sufficient to effectively maintain good
health: (1) quality of the water; (2) quantity of water available; (3) access to
water supply; (4) reliability of the supply; (5) cost of water use; and (6) ease

36. Paul R. Hunter, Alan M. MacDonald & Richard C. Carter, Water Supply and Health, PLOS
MED.
(Nov.
2010),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2976720/pdf/pmed.1000361.pdf. “Access to a
safe and continuous supply of water for drinking, cooking, and personal hygiene is an essential
prerequisite for health.” Id. at 8.
37. Id. at 1; see also Guy Howard & Jamie Bartram, Domestic Water Quantity, Service Level
and Health, WHO (2003), https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/WSH03.02.pdf.
38. Howard & Bartram, supra note 37.
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of use by consumers.39 Inadequacies in any of the six factors can be
associated with significant health risks,40 including infection or even death.
Despite water’s importance, many Americans have historically lacked
access to a safe, reliable, and affordable source. A 2017 study by human
rights non-profit DigDeep and the U.S. Water Alliance found that more than
two million people in the United States did not have access to clean water.41
Lack of water access disproportionately affects low-income people of color.
Race is the single variable “most strongly associated with access to complete
plumbing.”42 African American and Latino households are twice as likely to
lack complete plumbing than white households,43 while Native American
households are nineteen times more likely to lack complete plumbing than
white households.44 A 2021 study on water affordability found that census
tracts with a majority Black, Hispanic, and/or Asian population spend a
greater percentage of the household’s income on water bills, “while using
comparatively less water,” than households in majority white census tracts.45
However, socioeconomic status is also an important predictor in access to
public water utilities.46 Low household income and high unemployment rates
are correlated with decreased access to complete plumbing.47 This Part first
defines positive and negative rights approaches to water. It then examines
the effects of these approaches on water access, focusing on how the United
39. Hunter et al., supra note 36, at 3 (“[I]mprovements in water supply are essential
prerequisites for improved personal and home hygiene . . . .”).
40. Howard & Bartram, supra note 37, at 8.
41. Roller et al., supra note 29.
42. Id. at 22. “Indoor plumbing refers to the presence of hot-and-cold running water, a shower
or bath, and a flush toilet in the home. Until recently, the Census Bureau used the term ‘complete
plumbing’ to refer to these components. In 2016 the Census Bureau removed toilets from its
definition of complete plumbing.” Id. at 17. For a detailed overview of the history of segregated
water access, see Coty Montag, Water/Color: A Study of Race & the Water Affordability Crisis in
America’s Cities, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND 3 (2019), https://www.naacpldf.org/wpcontent/uploads/Water_Report_FULL_5_31_19_FINAL_OPT.pdf (“Our research confirmed a
clear connection between racial residential segregation and Black access to water systems.”).
43. Roller et al., supra note 29, at 22 (“Nationwide, 0.3 percent of white households lack
complete plumbing, as compared to 0.5 percent of African-American and Latinx households . . . .
In fact, our analysis showed that the larger the share of Native American, African-American, Latinx,
or Pacific Islander residents living in a census tract, the higher the percentage of homes that lack
complete plumbing.”).
44. Id. The analysis found that 5.8% of Native American households lack access to complete
plumbing. Id. “For Native American and Pacific Islander communities, race is a more significant
predictor of plumbing access than any other factor. That means that these groups are equally likely
to lack complete plumbing whether they are high- or low-income, and whether they live in urban or
rural areas.” Id. (footnote omitted).
45. City of Chicago Water Affordability Analysis, METRO. PLAN. Council (Jan. 18, 2022),
https://www.metroplanning.org/multimedia/publication/2029 (emphasis added) (“[C]ensus tracts
with a majority Black population pay on average 19% of their income on water bills.”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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States’ negative rights framework has been tested by the COVID-19
pandemic.
A. Water Rights Frameworks
World leaders have cooperatively undertaken a variety of initiatives to
expand water access and to recognize a human right to water.48 Two
methodologies dominate these initiatives: public proclamations and
international treaties. Public proclamations are cooperative international
statements. Two well-known examples are the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (“UDHR”)49 and United Nations Resolution 64/292,50 which
together assert that human beings have a right to water. Though widely
regarded as the foundation of international human rights law,51 the UDHR is
not legally binding:52 while aspirational, it does not make individual countries
responsible for meeting the obligations of their citizens’ water rights. U.N.
resolutions, on the other hand, must be approved by a majority vote in the
General Assembly and can be binding on U.N. member states in certain
circumstances.53 However, many resolutions are written in ways that allow

48. Cf. Rhett B. Larson, Water Security, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 145 (2017) (noting that war,
immigration, disease management, energy production, and food production are all dependent on a
stable supply of water); see, e.g., Press Release, World Bank, 12 World Leaders Issue Clarion Call
for Accelerated Action on Water (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/pressrelease/2018/03/14/12-world-leaders-issue-clarion-call-for-accelerated-action-on-water.
49. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 ¶ 1 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(stating that “[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services”); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General
Comment No. 15, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (Jan. 20, 2003) (“The human right to water is
indispensable for leading a life in human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other
human rights.”).
50. G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292, at 1–2 (July 28, 2010) (“The General
Assembly . . . [r]ecalling also the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . [r]ecognizes the right
to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right that is essential for the full
enjoyment of life and all human rights . . . .”).
51. George E. Edwards, Assessing the Effectiveness of Human Rights Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) from the Birth of the United Nations to the 21st Century: Ten Attributes of
Highly Successful Human Rights NGOs, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 165, 172 n.14 (2010) (“The U.N.
intended the UDHR to be a ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations.’ . . . These rights form the bases for over 100 U.N. treaties, declarations and other
instruments, and for many national constitutions and other domestic law sources.”).
52. See
generally
Human
Rights
Law,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/thematic-areas/international-law-courts-tribunals/human-rights-law/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
53. See generally Are UN Resolutions Binding?, U.N. DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR. (May 12,
2021), https://ask.un.org/faq/15010 (stating that “[t]he nature of the resolution determines if it is
considered binding on States.”).
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wide latitude for member state compliance.54 For example, U.N. resolution
64/292 calls on members55 to “provide financial resources, capacity-building
and technology transfer . . . in order to scale up efforts to provide safe, clean,
accessible and affordable drinking water and sanitation for all.”56 But the
resolution does not state how much money members should contribute, what
kinds of technology should be shared, or address any number of other
logistical concerns inherent in the resolution. Implementation of the
resolution is entirely dependent on how each member state voluntarily
incorporates the resolution’s obligations into binding domestic law and
policy.57 Thus, while these public proclamations signal that broad water
access is an important priority to leaders, they do not create legal causes of
action for failure to comply.58
International treaties also promote water access. Several treaties—the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”),59 the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”),60
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”)61—
provide qualified support for a human right to water.62 These treaties are
binding on signatories who ratify them. The United States is a signatory to
each of these treaties, but has refused to ratify them,63 meaning that the
United States symbolically supports and will not undermine these
agreements, but has not consented to be bound by them.64 However, much
like UN resolutions, these treaties use language that provides substantial
discretion in compliance. For example, the CRC declares that signatories
54. Doug Donoho, Some Critical Thinking About a Human Right to Water, 19 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 91, 98 (2012).
55. The United States abstained from voting on this resolution and thus does not consent to be
bound by it. See Emily M. Thor, Comment, The Human Right to Water in the United States: Why
So Dangerous?, 26 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOB. BUS. & DEV. L.J. 315, 317 n.15 (2013).
56. G.A. Res. 64/292, supra note 50, at 3.
57. Donoho, supra note 54, at 96.
58. Id. at 98–102.
59. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC].
60. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 14,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
61. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 28, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S.
3.
62. Donoho, supra note 54, at 94–98.
63. Arlene S. Kanter, Let’s Try Again: Why the United States Should Ratify the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 35 TOURO L. REV. 301, 301–02 (2019).
64. What is the Difference Between Signing, Ratification and Accession of UN Treaties?, U.N.
DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR. (Apr. 26, 2018), https://ask.un.org/faq/14594; KEVIN MURRAY &
SARA KOMINERS, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER FOR
LAWYERS & COMMUNITY LEADERS 2–3 (2018) (stating that “[w]here the U.S. has signed, but not
ratified a treaty, it is obligated ‘to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
[the] treaty’”) (second alteration in original).
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recognize the right of a child to enjoy the highest attainable standard of
health, which obligates national leaders to take appropriate measures to
ensure that children have access to clean drinking water.65 But that obligation
is limited to the “maximum extent of [a country’s] available resources.”66
This caveat creates a significant loophole that a state can use to remain
compliant with the treaty in letter while violating it in spirit. Consider the
following hypothetical scenario: Nation A may decide that military security
is its highest priority, and thus deserving of the bulk of resources—say 80%
of its annual budget. The remaining 20% of Nation A’s budget would need
to be used to meet various other societal needs, like transportation or
infrastructure. In the end, perhaps only a fraction of that 20% would be
“available” to provide water for children. Thus, under the CRC’s language,
Nation A can allocate a nominal amount of resources toward providing water
for children and still meet their treaty obligations. This example is extreme,
but underscores a larger point—however well-intentioned these public
proclamations and international treaties, their broad assertions and hedged
support for water access do not create a legal right to water; mechanisms of
enforcement do. Because the aforementioned proclamations and treaties lack
enforcement mechanisms, they are better regarded as aspirational, an
expression of “how the world ought to be,” rather than an assertion of
cognizable legal claims to water.67 An international aspiration for a human
right to water is undoubtedly a good thing, but to meaningfully provide water
access requires cognizable rights coupled with enforcement.
How a particular government approaches the apportionment of water is
largely a function of whether the nation views the right to water as a positive
or negative right.68 A positive right is “freedom to”—a guarantee that the
government will provide a certain quality or quantity of a good or service to
its citizens.69 Negative rights, in contrast, are “freedom from”—prohibiting
state interference with a particular interest unless the government meets
minimum standards of due process and public consent.70 In the context of
water, positive rights impose an affirmative obligation on the government to
provide clean water for citizens, while negative rights restrict the government
from interfering with water access without due process and public
accountability. Each approach provides benefits and challenges for a
government working to ensure broad access to water.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

CRC, supra note 59.
Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).
Donoho, supra note 54, at 95.
Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864 (2001).
Rhett B. Larson, The New Right in Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2187–203 (2013).
Id.
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Under a positive rights approach, broad water access is a government
priority that necessitates physical and bureaucratic infrastructure to support
large scale transportation and distribution of water. The ability to leverage
that infrastructure can lead to faster, more agile government responses during
outbreaks (e.g., being able to provide free, potable water quickly). As a
result, a positive right to water provides both health and environmental
benefits; stable access to clean water eases disease prevention and
management.71 The 1918 Spanish flu pandemic,72 cholera outbreaks in
London73 and Haiti,74 and the COVID-19 pandemic75 demonstrate that broad
access to clean water is critical to preventing and containing disease. In
contrast, systems where broad public water distribution is not a top priority
may be less agile, both due to lack of infrastructure and the need to negotiate
with private parties. Additionally, a positive right to water requires proactive
anti-pollution efforts and responsible resource management by the
government, thereby improving the surrounding environment. A nation
cannot meet its water provision obligations if its supply is too contaminated
for consumption76 or dries up because of unsustainable environmental policy
choices.77
Even though a positive right to water brings desirable benefits, it comes
with complex barriers to implementation. Government action in service of a
positive right to water is expensive and a significant logistical challenge.
Policymakers must first determine a sustainable water source. In some
instances, water must be redistributed from areas that have abundant water to
areas that have little.78
Those decisions must take into account
environmental, sociocultural, and economic impacts that such redistribution
would have on people and animals living near the water source. In some
places, those considerations might render a positive right to water
unsustainable.

71. Rhett B. Larson, Law in the Time of Cholera, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1271, 1290–99
(2017) (discussing the “Red Agenda” of water law and policy, which focuses on “preventing and
mitigating the outbreak of communicable diseases”).
72. Nancy Tomes, “Destroyer and Teacher”: Managing the Masses During the 1918–1919
Influenza Pandemic, 125 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 48 (2010).
73. Larson, supra note 71, at 1272–73.
74. Id. at 1273–74.
75. See generally Aparna Lal, Robyn M. Lucas & Anthony Slatyer, Water Access as a Required
Public Health Intervention to Fight COVID-19 in the Pacific Islands, LANCET REG’L HEALTH – W.
PAC.
(July
24,
2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S26666065%2820%2930006-7.
76. See Yuliya Vystavna & Dmytro Diadin, Water Scarcity and Contamination in Eastern
Ukraine, 366 PROC. INT’L ASS’N HYDROLOGICAL SCI. 149, 150 (2015).
77. Peter Brabeck-Letmathe, The Damage Caused by Water Overuse, WORLD ECON. F. (Dec.
10, 2014), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/the-damage-caused-by-water-overuse/.
78. Donoho, supra note 54, at 108–10.
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Moreover, a positive right to water places the onus of water
transportation on the government. The logistical challenge—pumping,
treating, and transporting the water—is significant.79 Water is markedly
more expensive to transfer over distances than other resources.80 To
illustrate, if a government needed to deliver water to citizens 100 kilometers
from its source, approximately 50% of the wholesale cost of the water would
come from the transportation alone, in contrast to 2.5% for natural gas, and
5% for electricity.81 The costs of building infrastructure and transporting
water can have an outsized negative impact on rural areas if recipients are
charged directly for transportation as opposed to a general tax fund or state
subsidy.82 This is due to the fact that rural areas have smaller populations
(compared with urban areas), meaning that fewer people are available to
generate revenue for the water distribution system’s infrastructure
construction and maintenance.83 Further, there is an inverse relationship
between the size of a water system and the length of its distribution pipes;
smaller rural systems have to spend more per connection to maintain a stable
water supply than urban areas, and with a smaller revenue base.84 In a nation
with a positive right to water, funding for rural water systems might be offset
by higher water rates in urban areas. Such resource redistribution can build
resentment and sap political will to invest in rural infrastructure.85 These
challenges make it difficult to garner the political will necessary to effectuate
a positive right to water.
Despite the challenges and costs inherent to a positive right to water, a
few countries have adopted this approach.86 South Africa’s constitution was
one of the first to codify a positive right to water.87 Section 27 of the South
African constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to have access
to . . . sufficient food and water.”88 However, Section 27 also states the
government is only obligated to take reasonable measures to achieve the
79. Id.
80. Vanessa Casado Perez, Liquid Business, 47 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 201, 215–16 (2019).
81. Id. at 216.
82. Faqir Singh Bagi, Small Rural Communities’ Quest for Safe Drinking Water, 17 RURAL
AM. 40, 40 (2002).
83. Id. at 42–43.
84. Id. at 40–41.
85. See generally Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from
California’s Central Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2012) (discussing the challenges
associated with rural water provision); Camille Pannu, Bridging the Safe Drinking Water Gap for
California’s Rural Poor, 24 UC HASTINGS ENV. L.J. 253, 256 (2018) (same).
86. Larson, supra note 48, at 182–84 (listing Ecuador, India, and South Africa as examples).
87. Andrew L. Magaziner, The Trickle Down Effect: The Phiri Water Rights Application and
Evaluating, Understanding, and Enforcing the South African Constitutional Right to Water, 33 N.C.
J. INT’L L. 509, 580 (2008).
88. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2 § 27(1)(b).
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“progressive realisation” of that right.89 South Africa uses a multi-tiered
structure to accomplish this “progressive realisation”; the national
government is responsible for managing water resources through various
boards, and municipalities are responsible for the actual delivery of water and
sanitation services.90 In interpreting Section 27, the South African
Constitutional Court has written that an individual’s right to water is not “a
self-standing and independent positive right enforceable irrespective of” the
government’s available resources.91 Rather, South Africans have a right to
water, and the government is responsible for “creat[ing] [the physical and
economic] mechanisms that enable people to have access to sufficient
water.”92 If South Africa’s resources are unavoidably constrained, the
government is still responsible for providing “a plan of action that
demonstrates that the full realisation of the right [to water] shall be achieved
over time.”93
This commitment was put to the test in 2018 when Cape Town, after a
three-year drought, was in danger of becoming the first major city in the
world whose taps ran dry.94 To avoid the coming catastrophe, the national
Department of Water and Sanitation released a national master plan to the
public,95 and the rest of the government got to work.96 Through a
combination of public education campaigns, aggressive water conservation
policies, and much needed rain, Cape Town was able to continue providing
water to all residents.97 Across the country, approximately 93% of South
Africans have access to at least basic water services and approximately 76%
have access to basic sanitation services.98
89. Id.
90. S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, The Right to Water & Sanitation,
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/SAHRC%20Water%20and%20Sanitation%20revised%20
pamphlet%2020%20March%202018.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2021).
91. Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at 25 para. 49 (S. Afr.).
92. S. AFR. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, 3RD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS REPORT 298 (2003),
https://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Economic%20and%20Social%20Rights%202000.pdf.
93. Id.; see also Gov’t of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom 2000 (11) (CC) at 31 para.
39 (S. Afr.).
94. William Saunderson-Meyer, Commentary: In Drought-Hit South Africa, the Politics of
Water, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saundersonmeyerdrought-commentary/commentary-in-drought-hit-south-africa-the-politics-of-wateridUSKBN1FP226.
95. See generally Trevor Balzer, National Water & Sanitation Master Plan: Water Security and
Water Governance in South Africa, S. AFR. DEP’T OF WATER & SANITATION (June 8, 2018),
https://agbiz.co.za/uploads/2018-Congress/Trevor.pdf.
96. Avoiding a Water Crisis: How Capetown Avoided ‘Day Zero,’ GLOBAL RESILIENCE INST.
AT NE. U.,
https://globalresilience.northeastern.edu/avoiding-a-water-crisis-how-capetownavoided-day-zero (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
97. Id.
98. WHO & UNICEF, PROGRESS ON HOUSEHOLD DRINKING WATER, SANITATION, AND
HYGIENE 2000–2017: SPECIAL FOCUS ON INEQUALITIES
102,
122
(2019),
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In contrast to the positive water rights approach typified by South
Africa, the majority of jurisdictions take a negative rights approach to water.
Governments that approach water as a negative right are free from the
financial pressures created by an obligation to provide water to all residents.
Instead, these governments can choose to spend money building and
maintaining water infrastructure, but are not forced to do so.99 Absent a
government obligation to provide water to all residents, wealth determines
access, and anyone who cannot afford to pay for water is left behind.
Residents without access to water are vulnerable to crises like disease and/or
drought.100
The United States does not recognize a positive right to water. Instead,
it recognizes water rights as property rights, centered around an owner’s right
to use and to exclude others. While not legally the same as a negative right,
the practical effect is much the same. Most rights in the United States are
negative rights, called upon as a response to government abuse or to curtail
restrictions of personal liberties.101 Negative rights are foundational to the
American legal framework; many of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights
are negative. The Constitution guarantees freedom from several things—
Americans are free from government infringement on speech and religious
expression, and free from unreasonable government searches, for example.102
At the same time, the U.S. government does not have to provide citizens with
a platform to speak, or churches to worship in. Likewise, the U.S. legal
system protects individual property owners’ water rights from encroachment,
but is under no obligation to provide water itself.

https://washdata.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2019-07/jmp-2019-washhouseholds.pdf. Ecuador, a nation that recognized a human right to water in its 2008 constitution,
has provided 94% of its population with basic water and 88% with basic sanitation as of 2017. Id.
at 92, 110; see also Cristy Clark, Of What Use is a Deradicalized Human Right to Water?, 17 HUM.
RTS. L. REV. (UK) 231, 252–53 (2017). India, a nation that recognized a human right to water in
its constitution has provided 93% of its population with basic water and 60% with basic sanitation
as of 2017. Id. at 94, 114. Despite the challenges inherent in providing a universal right to water,
these nations have demonstrated that it is possible to successfully undertake a positive rights
approach to the right to water. Moreover, they have done so with significantly less resources than
the United States.
99. Larson, supra note 69, at 2184–87.
100. In extreme cases, water scarcity can lead to political instability. See, e.g., Peter H. Gleick,
Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria, 6 WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 331, 332–
36 (2014); Collin Douglas, A Storm Without Rain: Yemen, Water, Climate Change, and Conflict,
CTR. FOR CLIMATE & SEC. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://climateandsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/a-storm-without-rain_yemen-water-climate-change-and-conflict_briefer40.pdf; Margaret Suter, Running Out of Water: Conflict and Water Scarcity in Yemen and Syria,
ATL. COUNCIL (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/running-out-ofwater-conflict-and-water-scarcity-in-yemen-and-syria.
101. Donoho, supra note 54, at 105.
102. U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV.
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In the United States, water is subject to private ownership, though
regulated by public entities; thus, water rights discussions and disputes
typically concern property rights, rather than human rights.103 Further,
property rights in water in the United States operate under a decentralized
system based primarily on state law, rather than federal law.104 Even though
the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act create water quality
protections at the federal level, neither law creates a right to water for
residents.105 Individual state approaches to water property rights generally
fall into one of two categories based on geography: riparian regimes in the
east and prior appropriation regimes in the west.106
Because clean water access in the United States is largely predicated on
the ability to pay for it, the number of people without water access can
drastically increase during events that cause an economic downturn. From
rural California107 and Appalachia108 to the inner cities of Baltimore,
Cleveland, and Detroit,109 the unaffordability and unavailability of clean
water has been a longstanding problem for millions of disadvantaged
Americans. Access to water under a negative rights framework may appear
to circumvent thorny arguments and expensive infrastructure spending
involved in the positive rights approach, but beneath that veneer of simplicity
are cracks for people to fall through. For many, economic hardship is enough
to jeopardize continuing access to potable water; they are collateral damage
to the American negative rights approach. The COVID-19 pandemic
demonstrated that when pushed, American governments can (and do) enact
policies that limit the damage—policies that come strikingly close to
recognizing a positive right to water.

103. However, some scholars have argued that “water should be treated as a ‘constitutive
commitment’” (something “that falls short of a constitutional right but that has attained nearconstitutional significance” and therefore “worthy of protection through legislation”). See, e.g.,
Sharmila L. Murthy, A New Constitutive Commitment to Water, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 159,
159–60 (2016).
104. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 53, 53 (2011).
105. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251; Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f; Catarina
de Albuquerque (Special Rapporteur on the Human Right to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation);
Mission to the United States of America, ¶¶ 8–9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/33/Add.4 (Aug. 2, 2011).
106. Discussed in more detail infra notes 183–186 and accompanying text.
107. Pannu, supra note 85, at 224–27.
108. Sydney Boles, Water is Unaffordable for Nearly Half of This Kentucky County’s Residents,
100 DAYS IN APPALACHIA (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.100daysinappalachia.com/2019/10/wateris-unaffordable-for-nearly-half-of-this-kentucky-countys-residents/.
109. Montag, supra note 42, at 31–33.
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B. American Water Rights and COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic tested the limits of the United States’
commitment to a negative rights approach to water. Facing a highly
contagious virus with the potential to overwhelm the medical capacity of
American hospitals, health education campaigns urged the public to “flatten
the curve”—slowing the spread of the virus through preventative measures
like social distancing and hand hygiene.110 To combat the spread of COVID19, the CDC recommended that all individuals “wash [their] hands often with
soap and water for at least 20 seconds.”111 Soap and water are an effective
means of combatting the spread of viruses in two ways. First, soap molecules
insert themselves into the lipid envelopes of some microbes and viruses,
thereby tearing them apart.112 Once broken, “[e]ssential proteins spill from
the ruptured membranes into the surrounding water, killing the bacteria and
rendering the viruses useless.”113 Second, some soap molecules disturb the
bonds that permit bacteria and viruses to adhere to surfaces.114
While there is not yet data on the reduction of COVID-19 cases
attributable to handwashing, studies on the effect of hand hygiene on other
viruses underscore its effectiveness. Handwashing can prevent nearly 30%
of diarrhea-related illness and nearly 20% of respiratory infections.115 For
individuals with compromised immune systems, handwashing reduces
diarrheal illness by 58%.116 The ability of handwashing to prevent infection
and illness increases with frequency; the more an individual washes their
hands, the greater the protection.117 Further, handwashing is more effective
110. Hand-Washing in the Time of COVID-19, U.C. BERKELEY SOC. SCI. MATRIX (Apr. 13,
2020), https://matrix.berkeley.edu/research/hand-washing-time-covid-19.
111. How to Protect Yourself and Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html (last visited Jan.
31, 2022) (“If soap and water are not readily available, use a hand sanitizer that contains at least
60% alcohol.”). But see Ferris Jabr, Why Soap Works, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/health/soap-coronavirus-handwashing-germs.html (“On the
whole, hand sanitizers are not as reliable as soap. Sanitizers with at least 60 percent ethanol do act
similarly, defeating bacteria and viruses by destabilizing their lipid membranes. But they cannot
easily remove microorganisms from the skin.”).
112. Jabr, supra note 111 (citing Professor Pall Thordarson, acting head of chemistry at the
University of New South Wales, who noted, “[soap molecules] act like crowbars and destabilize the
whole system”).
113. Id.
114. Id. (“When you rinse your hands, all the microorganisms that have been damaged, trapped
and killed by soap molecules are washed away.”).
115. Show Me the Science – Why Wash Your Hands, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/why-handwashing.html#two (last visited Jan. 31,
2022).
116. Id.
117. Elaine Larson et al., Short- and Long-Term Effects of Handwashing with Antimicrobial or
Plain Soap in the Community, 28 J. CMTY. HEALTH 139, 148 (2003) (“[T]he results of this study
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in reducing illness than alcohol-based hand sanitizers.118 This is consistent
with CDC and WHO guidelines, which recommend using hand sanitizer to
clean hands only if soap and water are unavailable.119 Given the ease of
transmission of COVID-19, regular and frequent handwashing is necessary
to protect against infection.
While the CDC and WHO stressed the importance of frequent
handwashing, the contagiousness of COVID-19 required governments to
concurrently take drastic steps to slow the spread of the virus. In the United
States, schools and businesses were closed, events were canceled, and the
population was encouraged to shelter in place.120 The measures were
successful in their goal of curbing transmission rates.121 However, in doing
so, businesses around the country laid off workers, and nearly sixty million
Americans filed for unemployment insurance.122 After achieving a fifty-year
record of 3.5% unemployment in February 2020, the pandemic-induced
unemployment rate peaked at 14.8% in April 2020,123 dropping total GDP by
a record 35.5%.124 Unemployment was higher than it had been at any time

demonstrate the minimal effect of a single handwash with either plain or antimicrobial soap on the
quantity of hand flora. On the other hand, the significant reduction in [microbial] counts after one
year of use . . . indicates that sustained and consistent hand hygiene practices significantly reduce
microbial counts over time.”).
118. Allison E. Aiello et al., Effect of Hand Hygiene on Infectious Disease Risk in the Community
Setting: A Meta-Analysis, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1372, 1378 (2008) (“This was unexpected given
that alcohol-based antiseptics containing 60% to 80% weight per volume have been shown to be
effective against a range of viruses and bacteria, including agents that cause diarrhea or respiratory
infections.”).
119. When and How to Wash Your Hands, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://web.archive.org/web/20220112093704/https://www.cdc.gov/handwashing/when-howhandwashing.html (last updated Aug. 10, 2021); see also Clean Hands Protect Against Infection,
WHO,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200708082927/https://www.who.int/gpsc/clean_hands_protection/
en/ (last visited July 20, 2020).
120. Lockdowns, Closures: How is Each US State Handling Coronavirus?, AL JAZEERA (Apr.
14,
2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/emergencies-closures-states-handlingcoronavirus-200317213356419.html.
121. James H. Fowler et al., Stay-at-Home Orders Associate with Subsequent Decreases in
COVID-19 Cases and Fatalities in the United States, PLOS ONE (June 10, 2021),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0248849.
122. Jack Kelly, Jobless Claims: 57.4 Million Americans Have Sought Unemployment Benefits
Since Mid-March—Over 1 Million People Filed Last Week, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2020, 11:13 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/08/20/jobless-claims-574-million-americans-havesought-unemployment-benefits-since-mid-marchover-1-million-people-filed-lastweek/?sh=317c23b66d59.
123. FALK ET AL., supra note 30, at 2, 5.
124. GDP
Now,
FED.
RSRV.
BANK
OF
ATLANTA,
https://web.archive.org/web/20200716231255/https://www.frbatlanta.org/cqer/research/gdpnow
(last visited July 16, 2020).
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since the Great Depression.125 In March 2020, Congress passed the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, which
provided many with a one-time $1,200 stimulus payment and temporarily
expanded unemployment benefits.126 The Act was designed to “provide
emergency assistance and health care response for individuals, families, and
businesses affected by the 2020 coronavirus pandemic” and address the
staggering number of unemployment claims caused by the closing of
nonessential businesses in response to COVID-19.127 Perhaps assuming the
United States would gain control of COVID-19’s spread by the end of
summer 2020, the increased unemployment insurance provided by the
CARES Act expired on July 31, 2020.128
Unfortunately, rather than decreasing over the summer of 2020, the
number of COVID-19 cases spiked dramatically and continued to climb.129
Many states attempted to re-open their economies in late May 2020, and the
resulting social contact gave the initial outbreak new life.130 As a result, some
states paused or rolled back their economic reopening while the support
provided by the CARES Act simultaneously approached its expiration.131
For unemployed individuals, the rollbacks made it even more difficult to find
replacement employment. For those who went back to work after the
reopening, the spike in COVID-19 cases jeopardized their employment
security and economic stability. After losing a steady source of income,

125. Paul Hannon, Unemployment Expected to Reach Highest Level Since Great Depression,
WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unemployment-expected-toreach-highest-level-since-great-depression-11594112400.
126. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136,
§ 2201, 134 Stat. 318 (2020) (codified at I.R.C. § 6428). The amount of money that each person
received under this legislation is inversely related to their earnings as reported on their most recent
tax filing; those who made the least money received the maximum $1200 payment per adult, and
$500 per dependent. Id.
127. S. 516 116th Cong. (2020).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 9023.
129. Key Updates for Week 34 Ending August 22, 2020, COVIDVIEW 2 (Aug. 22, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/pdf/covidview-08-28-2020.pdf;
Will
Feuer & Nate Rattner, U.S. Reports Record 67,400 Single-Day Spike of New Coronavirus Cases,
CNBC (July 15, 2020, 10:25 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/15/us-reports-record-67400single-day-spike-of-new-coronavirus-cases.html; Will Stone, U.S. Coronavirus Cases Surpass
Summer Peak and Are Climbing Higher Fast, NPR (Oct. 27, 2020, 10:14 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/10/27/928062773/u-s-cases-surpass-summerpeak-and-are-climbing-higher-fast.
130. Lazaro Gamio, How Coronavirus Cases Have Risen Since States Reopened, N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/09/us/coronavirus-cases-reopeningtrends.html.
131. Griff Witte, Time to Shut Down Again? As Coronavirus Cases Surge, a Growing Chorus
Makes the Case, WASH. POST (July 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/time-toshut-down-again-as-coronavirus-cases-surge-a-growing-chorus-makes-thecase/2020/07/09/f0f0a950-c21b-11ea-9fdd-b7ac6b051dc8_story.html.
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many families were forced to make difficult choices about how to allocate
limited resources, including whether to pay for utilities, put food on the table,
or pay rent.132 Moreover, given historic occupational segregation that
resulted in “workers of color [being] overrepresented in the lowest-paid
agricultural, domestic, and service vocations [with] the least job security,”
the pandemic’s economic toll disproportionately affected minorities.133
Given that water access in the United States is contingent on ability to pay,
unemployment and loss of income threatened consumer access to water at a
time when hand hygiene was critical to slow the spread of the virus. As the
next Part discusses, this perfect storm galvanized states to take extraordinary
steps to increase water access, edging the United States toward a positive
right to water.
II. STATE ACTION TO INCREASE WATER ACCESS
In response to the rapid spread of COVID-19, states took action to
increase water access over the course of early-to-mid 2020. Within that span
of time—starting at the end of January 2020, when COVID-19 appeared in
the United States, and continuing through early May, when the initial wave
of the virus began to subside—thirty-three states adopted water utility
disconnection moratoria.134
Temporary suspension of water utility
disconnection in response to the pandemic shifted states toward actualizing
positive water rights; by prohibiting water utility providers from terminating
service, the government abandoned its consumer-driven approach and
instead proactively ensured, at least temporarily, that residents could access
clean water.135 Ultimately, utility disconnection moratoria successfully

132. This is similar to the “heat or eat” phenomenon wherein low-income families must make
“stark choices” in response to increased fuel expenditures. Jayanta Bhattacharya et al., Heat or Eat?
Cold Weather Shocks and Nutrition in Poor American Families 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
9004,
2002),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w9004/w9004.pdf. “We find that both rich and
poor families increase fuel expenditures in response to unusually cold weather . . . . At the same
time, poor families reduce food expenditures by roughly the same amount as the increase in fuel
expenditures, while rich families increase food expenditures.” Id. at 2.
133. Connor Maxwell & Danyelle Solomon, The Economic Fallout of the Coronavirus for
People of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 14, 2020, 9:20 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2020/04/14/483125/economic-falloutcoronavirus-people-color/.
134. State
Response
Tracker,
NAT’L
ASS’N
REGUL.
UTIL.
COMM’RS,
https://www.naruc.org/compilation-of-covid-19-news-resources/state-response-tracker/
(last
updated Mar. 23, 2021).
135. Id.
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reduced the rate of COVID-19 infections by nearly 4% and mortality by more
than 7%.136
The moratoria provide a foundation upon which positive water rights
can be advanced in the future. This Part reports the results of the authors’
statistical analysis. The goal of this analysis is to determine why
governments adopted COVID-19 water utility disconnection moratoria. It
begins with an overview of state water disconnection moratoria before
delving into statistical analysis to understand the factors that motivate state
action.
Within individual states, moratoria on water utility disconnections were
ordered either through public utility commissions (“PUCs”) or as an
executive order from governors.137 PUCs play an important role in whether
a state enacts a moratorium on any public utility. PUCs either enacted the
moratorium through their own delegated powers or advised governors on
whether to enact a moratorium through executive order.138
Of the thirty-three jurisdictions that enacted moratoria, the majority
included language stating that the moratoria would be in effect for the
duration of the state’s declared state of emergency.139 All of the moratoria
forbade providers from terminating water service, though some went further,
directing utility providers to return service to those that had previously been
disconnected for nonpayment.140 Almost every state that adopted a
moratorium included additional language that instructed utility providers to
offer reasonable repayment options for customers and encouraged these
customers to reach out to their utility providers to discuss repayment.141
136. Kay Jowers et al., Housing Precarity & the COVID-19 Pandemic: Impacts of Utility
Disconnection and Eviction Moratoria on Infections and Deaths Across US Counties 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28394, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28394.
137. See State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
138. See, e.g., Ky. P.U.C. Order No. 2020-00085 (Sept. 21, 2020) (PUC used their delegated
powers).
But see, e.g., Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020 012 (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/inlinefiles/D%202020%20012%20Order%20Limiting%20Evictions%2C%20Foreclosures%2C%20and
%20Public%20Utility%20Disconnections_0.pdf (governor was advised to do so via executive
order).
139. State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
140. Id. According to the moratoria found on the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioner’s State Response Tracker, the original moratoria of the following states required that
utility providers reconnect water services for those that had previous disconnections: Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Tennessee. Id.
141. See, e.g., N.H. Emergency Order No. 3 Pursuant to Exec. Order No. 2020-04 para. 3 (Mar.
17, 2020), https://www.governor.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt336/files/documents/emergencyorder-3.pdf (“At the end of the State of Emergency, customers having arrearages accrued during the
State of Emergency shall be provided the opportunity to make a reasonable payment arrangement
over no less than a six-month period and shall not be charged any fees for late payment for arrearages
accrued during the State of Emergency.”); Ark. P.U.C. Order No. 1 (Apr. 10, 2020) (writing on
Docket No. 20-012-A) (“The Commission encourages Utilities to offer reasonable payment
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While the enacted moratoria prohibited service disconnection, they did not
waive the obligation to repay.
Analysis of moratoria adoption reveals geographic trends.142 Within the
Northeast Region,143 eight out of nine states144 enacted a moratorium. The
Northeast had the greatest share of states that enacted a moratorium. While
a majority of states in other regions enacted moratoria, in contrast to the
Northeast, the majorities within those regions were slight. In the Southern
Region,145 ten out of sixteen states enacted a moratorium and six did not.146
In the Midwest Region,147 seven out of twelve states halted water
disconnections through the use of a moratorium.148 Finally, in the Western
Region,149 eight out of thirteen states enacted a moratorium on water
disconnections.150 Map 1 displays the states that adopted moratoria by early
May 2020 in dark blue.

arrangements once the prohibition on disconnections is lifted.”); Haw. P.U.C. Order No. 37125
(May 4, 2020) (“The Commission encourages Utilities to offer payment plans or other reasonable
arrangements to customers once the suspension of disconnections or terminations of service are
lifted.”). Some states, such as Iowa, Kansas, and Maryland, were vague about repayment options
or did not mention repayment options in their orders.
142. Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf (last visited Sept. 10,
2021) [hereinafter Census Regions]. The United States Census Bureau broadly classifies the
geographic regions of the United States as Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. Id.
143. Id. These states include Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Id.
144. Northeast Region states that enacted moratoria: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Northeast Region states that did
not enact a moratorium: New Jersey (note, however, that New Jersey enacted a moratorium after
the time of this data collection on August 15, 2020). See State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
145. Census Regions, supra note 142. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
146. Southern Region states that enacted moratoria: Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Southern Region
states that did not enact moratoria: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia. State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
147. Census Regions, supra note 142. These states include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Id.
148. Midwest Region states that enacted moratoria: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Ohio, and Wisconsin. Midwest Region states that did not enact moratoria: Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota. State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
149. Census Regions, supra note 142. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. Id.
150. Western Region states that enacted moratoria: Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Montana, New Mexico, Washington, and Wyoming. Western Region states that did not enact
moratoria: Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah. State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
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Map 1: States with Water Disconnection Moratoria by May 2020

A. Potential Factors Motivating Adoption of Moratoria
The goal of this regression analysis is to examine causal factors of state
adoption of COVID-19-related water utility disconnection moratoria. This
entails identifying potential explanations that could influence state adoption
of water disconnection moratoria as well as including those explanations
within our statistical regression analysis. This Section begins by briefly
summarizing potential explanations.
One set of possible factors influencing adoption of moratoria pertains to
a state’s level of poverty. Increased poverty in a state should correspond with
a reduced capacity to pay for water and a concomitant increased likelihood
of a state issuing a water disconnection moratorium. There are four pieces
of data that would reveal this potential linkage: (1) unemployment claims;
(2) the percentage of the population receiving Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) benefits; (3) per capita income; and (4) diversity.
The unemployment claims data is based on the United States
Department of Labor’s “Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Data.”151
Higher unemployment claims indicate greater economic stress on a state’s
residents. The TANF benefits data was gathered from the United States
Department of Health and Human Services.152 TANF provides material
benefits to households with children whose income falls beneath a certain

151. Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Data, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp (last updated Jan. 12, 2022).
152. TANF Caseload Data 2019, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/resource/tanf-caseload-data-2019.
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threshold.153 Unlike unemployment claims, which can include individuals
who are quite wealthy, TANF data is more likely to capture the number of a
state’s residents who are chronically poor.
Data on states’ per capita income, indicating the general amount of
wealth in a state’s population, comes from the United States Department of
Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis.154 State per capita income
information was recorded for the fourth quarter of 2019, and the variable was
standardized across states (thereby allowing for better cross-state
comparison) by capturing each state’s income as a percentage of the national
income level.
Finally, the diversity of a state, defined as the difference in the
percentage of a state’s white and non-white population, was provided by the
Kaiser Family Foundation and the United States Census Bureau.155 A higher
non-white population may correspond with greater poverty and an increased
likelihood of need for a state adopting a water moratorium. At the same time,
however, minorities might have less political efficacy, translating into an
inverse relationship between state diversity and the likelihood of a state
adopting a moratorium.
With poverty factors accounted for, political considerations are the next
possible explanation for the decision to enact moratoria. The decision to
enact a water moratorium must ultimately be made by politicians, and is
therefore subject to potential influence by political factors. This analysis
accounts for political considerations by using the percentage of a state’s
presidential vote that was received by Donald Trump in the 2016 election, as
153. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS.: ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/tanf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20220108172802/https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/temporaryassistance-needy-families-tanf] (last updated Nov. 17, 2020) (“The Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program provides state and territories with flexibility in operating
programs designed to help low-income families with children achieve economic self-sufficiency.”);
State TANF Data and Reports, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports (last updated Aug. 25, 2021) (“States
receive block grants to design and operate programs that accomplish the purposes of the TANF
program.”).
154. State Annual Personal Income, 2019 (Preliminary) and State Quarterly Personal Income,
4th Quarter 2019, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.bea.gov/news/2020/state-annual-personal-income-2019-preliminary-and-statequarterly-personal-income-4th. This data is examined because rich states may be more willing to
afford moratoria but poor states’ residents may be more likely to need moratoria.
155. 2019 National and State Population Estimates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-kits/2019/national-state-estimates.html (last updated
Dec. 30, 2019) (Under the “Datasets” heading, click “Annual Population Estimates, Estimated
Components of Resident Population Change, and Rates of the Components of Resident Population
Change for the United States, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019”); Population
Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2019), https://www.kff.org/other/stateindicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/.
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provided by the Federal Election Commission.156 A higher level of state vote
share earned by Trump might correspond with reduced support for
redistributive policies,157 like water utility disconnection moratoria, which
temporarily force utility providers to provide water access regardless of a
consumer’s ability to pay.
After considering poverty and political factors, the model finally
considers institutional factors. States have different institutional milieus
through which water connection administration occurs, and these different
institutional parameters can influence the likelihood of a state issuing a water
disconnection moratorium. The model recognizes two major categories: (1)
the selection process for PUC commissioners; and (2) public vs. private
ownership of utilities. Whether a state’s public utilities commissioners are
elected or appointed is a significant consideration at the state level. Direct
election of commissioners creates a situation where low price-setting is
maximally important, as voters prioritize low prices over other utility-related
regulatory issues.158 Needing to set low prices for voters may reduce the
ability of elected commissioners to impose moratoria since voters who do not
face disconnection may be unwilling to shoulder water fees while other
residents are allowed to defer payment. Lastly, the percentage of a state’s
water districts that are privately owned may influence that state’s likelihood
of adopting a disconnection moratorium, as private enterprises may be less
likely than public entities to stomach deferred payment from customers.159
Moreover, for the purposes of constructing this variable, water districts that
are jointly owned by private and public ventures are considered to be private.
The following table provides a list of the variables utilized in the
statistical analysis. The first variable is the dependent variable that we seek
to explore: whether or not a state enacts a water disconnection moratorium.
The other variables are potential explanations influencing whether a state
enacts a water disconnection moratorium.

156. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2016: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S.
PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 6 (2017),
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/federalelections2016.pdf.
157. See generally Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Party Control of State
Government and the Distribution of Public Expenditures, 108 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 547, 547
(2006).
158. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and
Evidence, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1176, 1177 (2003).
159. SDWIS
Federal
Reports
Search,
U.S.
EPA
(May
19,
2017),
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/sfdw/f?p=108:200:::NO:::.
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Table 1: Variables Used in Analysis
VARIABLE
DESCRIPTION
NAME
Moratorium
Did a state adopt a moratorium that restricted water
Adoption
districts from disconnecting water utilities? 0 = no and
1 = yes.
Unemployment Initial state unemployment claims per week.
Claims
TANF
Percentage of the state’s residents that receive
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Per Capita
The standardized income of individuals within the state.
Income
This is the percentage of state per capita income of the
national per capita income.
Diversity
The percent of non-white citizens within a state.
Trump
The percent of the presidential vote in 2016 that went to
Donald Trump by state.
Elected/
Signifies whether a public utility commission’s
Appointed
members are appointed by the governor/legislature or if
they are elected by the people. 0 = elected and 1 =
appointed.
Private
The percent of water districts that are owned by nonOwnership
public entities (includes entities jointly owned by public
and private interests).

B. Data Analysis
Multivariate regression was used to analyze the relationships between
the dependent variable—whether a state adopted a moratorium—and each of
the independent variables discussed in Section II.A. Multivariate regression
is a standard analytical tool used to estimate the association between the
dependent variable and various independent variables.160 This technique
uncovers how much a given independent variable influences the dependent
variable in relation to other independent variables, and the certainty of the
relationship (certainty describes how much randomness could explain the
statistical results). This Article’s specific analysis utilized a technique called
the logistic estimator.161

160. See generally WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ch. 2 (8th ed. 2018).
161. J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT
VARIABLES USING STATA 8 (3d ed. 2014). The logistic estimator is well-suited for situations where
the dependent variable is binary (adopt versus do not adopt a moratorium) and estimated
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In total, the analysis examined 601 observations across the 50 states,
with 568 occurrences of non-adoption and 33 occurrences of adoption.162
The analysis tracked each state weekly for the entirety of the study period,
and inferences were made about what makes the states that adopted moratoria
different from those that did not. In estimating a multivariate logistic
regression with these 601 observations, only one explanation—
unemployment claims—is associated with a statistically significant increase
in the likelihood that a state adopted a water disconnection moratorium.163 In
other words, no variable other than unemployment is statistically likely to
lead to adoption of a moratorium. A positive relationship simply means that
higher amounts of initial weekly unemployment claims correspond to a
greater likelihood of a state adopting a water disconnection moratorium.
Figure 1 visualizes this relationship by plotting how increases in
unemployment influence the probability that a state adopts a water
disconnection moratorium.

relationships give us a sense of what makes adoption more likely, with a positive value indicating
greater likelihood and a negative value indicating lesser likelihood. Id.
162. The collected data follows what is called an event history format, a health sciences method
that has been adopted by the social sciences. In the event history format, each state has an
opportunity to adopt a moratorium at the beginning of the timeframe of the analysis and receives a
0 (corresponding to not adopting a moratorium when it had a chance to do so) for each week in
which it does not adopt a moratorium. When a state adopts a moratorium, it receives a 1
(corresponding to adopting a moratorium when it had a chance to do so) for the week in which it
made this action. For the following week and every week thereafter following that state’s adoption
of the moratorium, that state is excluded from the analysis. This is because the state has already
adopted a moratorium, so we cannot credibly say that it still has the opportunity to adopt a
moratorium. Of course, those states that still have not adopted moratoria remain in the analysis and
are similarly excluded in the week(s) following their adoptions (if they choose to do so).
163. This is based on a standard statistical critical value (or “p-value”) threshold of less than 1%.
This means that there is less than a 1% chance that the estimated relationship was obtained through
chance or randomness.
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Figure 1: How Unemployment Claims Influence Water Disconnection
Moratorium Adoption
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The figure above displays the number of initial weekly unemployment
claims on the x-axis and the probability of a state adopting a water
disconnection moratorium on the y-axis. Increased weekly unemployment
claims are associated with an increased likelihood of a state adopting a water
disconnection moratorium. We find that policymakers sometimes issue
moratoria in order to help disadvantaged segments of the public. However,
the fact that unemployment influences moratoria decision-making while
other poverty-related variables do not (e.g., TANF) suggests that
policymakers are more attuned to sudden shifts in need among the general
population than need among the chronically disadvantaged.164
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON A POSITIVE RIGHT TO WATER
The ability of individual jurisdictions to move toward a positive right to
water by enacting utility disconnection moratoria is predicated on a state’s

164. A caveat here is that social science uses the language of probability; thus, the result suggests
that there is greater probability of an association between unemployment and moratorium adoption
(i.e., greater unemployment increases the likelihood of moratorium adoption) than there is of an
association between the other variables (e.g., TANF or diversity) and moratorium adoption.
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valid exercise of its police powers.165 Chief Justice Taney described state
police powers as “nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions.”166 The scope
of the police powers is subject to ongoing debate among judges and
academics alike.167 One interpretation of the police power is broad,
comprising the entire panoply of powers remaining with the states after the
passage of the Constitution.168 Under this framework, the police power is
simply another name for a state’s ability to govern itself, in essence, a state’s
“sovereignty.”169 Another interpretation defines the police power “as the
authority to provide for the public health, safety, and morals.”170 Under both
frameworks, the police power grants a state the authority to regulate essential
public utilities, like water, during a pandemic. While police powers provide
jurisdictions with wide latitude to enact policies in the interest of health,
safety, and welfare, the ability of policymakers to expand the right to water
remains subject to limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
on taking private property for public use without just compensation and the
prohibition against interference with private contracts in Article I of the
Constitution.
A. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Constitution prevents the government from
seizing private property for public use without just compensation.171 Takings
law is derived from eminent domain, “the inherent power of the sovereign to
take private property, as principally constrained by the ‘public use’ and ‘just
compensation’ prerequisites of the Takings Clause.”172 However, “not every
165. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 107 (1985) (defining police powers as “those grants of power to the federal and state
government that survive the explicit limitations found in the Constitution”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (“[T]hat immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws
of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those which
respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c., are component parts of this mass.”).
166. Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847).
167. For a more detailed overview of police power, see Santiago Legarre, The Historical
Background of the Police Power, 9 UNIV. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 747 (2007).
168. See generally D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIA.
L. REV. 471, 472 (2004).
169. Id. at 475–76 (noting that at the time the Constitution was drafted, courts and commentators
spoke broadly regarding states’ powers to promote public justice or enact regulations, and the term
“internal police” described state sovereignty during the constitutional debates).
170. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
172. Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 310
(2007) (citing United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946)).
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destruction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be
a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.”173 Describing the purpose of the
Takings Clause, Justice Hugo Black stated that the “Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole.”174
At the heart of Fifth Amendment analysis is a need to first define the
nature of the taking and the type of private property at issue. Eminent domain
is the classic example of a land use taking.175 In eminent domain cases, “[t]he
government effects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to
submit to the physical occupation of his land.”176 For example, a government
may take title to a property to construct a highway, take possession of a mine
owned by a private company,177 or appropriate private land to build a border
wall. In each instance, the government affects a direct appropriation or
permanent physical occupation.
These actions—appropriation or
occupation—per se require compensation under the Fifth Amendment.178
Additionally, “regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the
classic taking in which the government directly appropriates private property
or ousts the owner from his domain”179 require compensation.180 There are
The power of eminent domain is essential to a sovereign government. If the United States
has determined its need for certain land for a public use that is within its federal sovereign
powers, it must have the right to appropriate that land. Otherwise, the owner of the land,
by refusing to sell it or by consenting to do so only at an unreasonably high price, is
enabled to subordinate the constitutional powers of Congress to his personal will. The
Fifth Amendment, in turn, provides him with important protection against abuse of the
power of eminent domain by the Federal Government.
Carmack, 329 U.S. at 236–37.
173. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
174. Id. at 49.
175. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (“The paradigmatic taking
requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private
property.”).
176. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527 (1992) (emphasis omitted). The Yee Court
noted that a physical taking also occurs, and “the Takings Clause generally requires compensation,”
when the government actually takes title to the subject property. Id. at 522. See also United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1946) (discussing how a non-physical easement created by use
of airspace above private property could be a taking if it were permanent).
177. See generally United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 115 (1951).
178. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426–27 (1982)
(“When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property,
this Court has invariably found a taking.”).
179. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
180. Yee, 503 U.S. at 522–23 (“[W]here the government merely regulates the use of property,
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or the extent
to which it deprives the owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has
unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a
whole.”).
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two categories of regulatory takings that per se require compensation under
the Fifth Amendment: (1) a physical taking or appropriation “where
government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her
property”;181 and (2) a per se “total taking” that eliminates the economic use
or value of private land.182
Applying this takings framework to a positive right to water first
requires an understanding of water property law. While a full discussion of
water property law is beyond the scope of this Article, a general overview is
instructive. Water property law in the United States developed along two
tracks. To the east of Kansas City, where water is abundant, regulated
riparian rights emerged; to the west, where water is a scarce resource, water
is regulated under the doctrine of appropriative rights.183 Under the eastern
riparian view, in most states water use is regulated by time-limited permits,
and the water must be put to a “reasonable use.”184 In contrast, under the
western appropriative rights approach, western state agencies administer
water rights “for the sole purpose of enforcing the previously defined
property rights.”185 But for the fact that the water rights are non-transferable,
this system operates very similarly to the organization of private property.186
In these jurisdictions, “the public owns the water—that is, the physical
molecules themselves—while private appropriators possess ‘usufructuary’
interests in the water.”187
The usufructuary nature of private water interests is significant for
takings analysis. As Professor John D. Echeverria notes, “the per se physical
takings theory is especially inapt in takings cases involving water because a
water-right holder has neither a legal right to the physical molecules
themselves nor a legal right to exclude others from using the water.”188 As
181. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
182. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017–19 (1992) (“[R]egulations that leave
the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under
the guise of mitigating serious public harm.”).
183. Dellapenna, supra note 104, at 53–54; A few states developed along a different, common
law track (e.g., Alabama and Tennessee). For detailed overview of water law, see ROBERT E. BECK,
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS; A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS & RESOURCES.
184. Dellapenna, supra note 104, at 87–88 (“Upon expiration of a permit, the continued
reasonableness of the use is reexamined, introducing a desirable flexibility into the development,
use, and protection of water resources. Regulated riparian statutes also include numerous provisions
for the protection of the public interest.”).
185. Id. at 54.
186. Id.
187. John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENV’T L.
579, 591 (2010); see also Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (“[T]he right of property in
water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use. . . . The
right is not in the corpus of the water, and only continues with its possession.”) (emphasis omitted).
188. Echeverria, supra note 187, at 592.
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such, the regulatory takings analysis is appropriately applied in instances
where a regulation changes how a private party uses water rights. Thus,
discussing regulatory takings is essential to understand both the limits of
American state and federal governments’ ability to provide water, and how
much more governments could do to enable broad water access.
1. Regulatory Takings and Water Use
If a regulation does not constitute a physical invasion of the property or
completely eliminate the economic use of a property, but nevertheless invites
concern that some people are being asked to bear an unfair burden, then the
balancing test set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York189 (“the Penn Central test”) is used.190 In Penn Central, the Court
developed a multi-factor balancing test to determine whether a partial taking
necessitated compensation under the Fifth Amendment. The Court
articulated three factors: (1) economic impact on the property owner; (2) the
extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct191 investment-backed
expectations;192 and (3) character193 of the governmental action.194 All
elements of the Penn Central test must be considered; no single factor is

189. 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
190. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005).
191. Meltz, supra note 172, at 330 n.150 (noting “the majority of Supreme Court takings
decisions since Penn Central use [the term ‘reasonable’ rather than ‘distinct’]. The Court has never
explained its alternations between the two terms. . . . ‘Distinct’ suggests a subjective standard.
‘Reasonable’ . . . redirected the inquiry toward the appropriateness of the plaintiff’s expectations,
particularly in the context of the regulatory landscape at the time the property was acquired.”).
192. Essentially, the second prong asks whether the enactment of “unanticipated change in
regulations” “erode[s] economic viability of the investment in the whole property.” William W.
Wade, “Sophistical and Abstruse Formulas” Made Simple: Advances in Measurement of Penn
Central’s Economic Prongs and Estimation of Economic Damages in Federal Claims and Federal
Circuit Courts, 38 URB. LAW. 337, 349 (2006). See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of the
regulation’s enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central
analysis. . . . Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time the claimant acquires the property
at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations.”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336 (2002) (adopting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence
in dicta); see also Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993)
(“[T]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed
by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.”) (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc.,
358 U.S. 84 (1958)).
193. A court is less likely to find a taking “when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Penn Cent.,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Furthermore, the Penn Central Court recognized that laws designed to
promote the general welfare “commonly burden[]” some property owners more than others. Id. at
133–34.
194. Id. at 124.
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dispositive.195 However, despite the Court’s articulated multi-part test,
partial regulatory takings are “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”196 The
Penn Central analysis “turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests.”197 The impact must be more
than some diminution in value arising from a regulation.198 Even if a
regulation deprives a property owner of the land’s “highest and best use,” it
is not, without more, a taking that requires compensation.199 The Supreme
Court has not articulated a percentage threshold beyond which there is a Penn
Central taking. The Court of Federal Claims, which possesses exclusive
jurisdiction over all takings claims against the federal government in excess
of $10,000,200 notes that “several Supreme Court decisions suggest that
diminutions in value approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate
the existence of a taking.”201 There is, however, variability. Some state
courts have found a taking when there was merely a 40% diminution in
value.202
The categories of regulatory takings that per se require just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment as well as the Penn Central ad hoc
analysis are concerned with takings that will endure for the foreseeable
future. In contrast, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency,203 the Court considered whether a regulation
imposing a thirty-two month land-use moratorium constituted a taking.204
The court held that moratoria, even when they eliminate any economic use
of a property, are subject to the Penn Central test because they are

195. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39.
196. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 505 U.S. at 326 (“In the
decades following [Penn Central], we have ‘generally eschewed’ any set formula for determining
how far is too far, choosing instead to engage in ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’”).
197. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
198. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 943 (1996) (discussing “Justice Holmes’s remark in
Pennsylvania Coal that government ‘hardly could go on’ if made to compensate every diminution
in value arising from its regulation”).
199. Meltz, supra note 172, at 335; see Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
200. Meltz, supra note 172, at 312 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (2007)).
201. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 357 (2006). While this case was not analyzed under
the Penn Central factors, it is noteworthy that “the Supreme Court held that a diminution of 93.7
percent did not constitute a categorical takings [sic].” Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1027–31 (1992). See also id. at 357 n.31 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926) (no taking despite 75% diminution); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (no taking despite 87.5% diminution)).
202. Meltz, supra note 172, at 335 n.191 (citing San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195
S.W.3d 238, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (40% loss in rental income from rezoning supports taking)).
203. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
204. Id. at 306.
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temporary.205 Applying this test, the Court held that “the duration of the
restriction is one of the important factors that a court must consider in the
appraisal of a regulatory takings claim, but . . . [t]he ‘temptation to adopt
what amount to per se rules in either direction must be resisted.’”206 While
Tahoe-Sierra rejected the formation of a per se rule for land-use moratoria,
it includes several limitations for future courts to consider when evaluating
similar regulations. Speaking to the duration of moratoria, the Court stated,
“[i]t may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for more than one year
should be viewed with special skepticism. . . . [But] we could not possibly
conclude that every delay of over one year is constitutionally
unacceptable.”207
Since water utility disconnection moratoria and other positive water
rights policies expand water access by constricting usufructuary water rights,
they invoke the Penn Central analysis. In the words of the Court, “[g]iven
that regulatory takings analysis focuses on how use rights have been
restricted, and usufructuary water interests consist only of use rights,
regulatory takings analysis applies in very straightforward fashion in takings
cases involving regulation of water interests.”208 However, expanding water
utility access not only implicates private water use rights, but also economic
investments of rightsholders. The provision of water in the United States
requires financial investment by a utility provider, and novel takings
concerns arise when a regulation affects a utility provider’s rate of return. A
separate judicial doctrine evolved around utility rate setting to address this
issue.
2. Confiscatory Rate Setting
In addition to regulatory takings, using utility disconnection moratoria
to expand access to water raises judicial analysis of “government rate
regulation in the context of public utilities.”209 A public utility is a “company
205. Id. at 337 (“In rejecting [the] per se rule [described in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council], we do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it
effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or
the other.”). But see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (stating
“regulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for
its use . . . carry with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form
of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm”).
206. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc., 505 U.S. at 342 (alteration in original) (quoting
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
207. Id. at 341–42. The Court also acknowledged that a “series of rolling moratoria” may serve
as the functional equivalent of a permanent taking. Id. at 333.
208. Echeverria, supra note 187, at 592 (emphasis omitted).
209. Susanne Cordner, Note, Adjusting the Benefits and Burdens of Economic Life for the Public
Good: The ACA’s Medical Loss Ratio as a Constitutional Regulation of Health Insurance
Companies, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 213, 228 (2015).
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that provides necessary services to the public, such as telephone lines and
service, electricity, and water. Most utilities operate as monopolies but are
subject to governmental regulation.”210 The United States uses a dual-tiered,
decentralized regulatory system to administer the provision of public utilities
like electricity, telecommunications, gas, and water.211 Within one tier, the
federal government exercises control over some interstate aspects of
electricity and natural gas supplies through the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.212 The other tier, comprised of each of the fifty states and the
District of Columbia, uses PUCs to regulate the local supply and
distribution.213 While all states have a PUC structure, there is variation in the
rate of public versus private ownership of water systems within the United
States. Alabama has the lowest percent of private ownership, at less than 3%,
while over 80% of Delaware’s water supply is privately owned.214
The number of commissioners on a PUC varies by state, as does the way
that they are seated. In thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia,
commissioners are appointed by the governor (or the mayor in the case of
D.C.); two states elect commissioners via the legislature; and in the eleven
other jurisdictions, commissioners are elected.215 Regardless of how they are
selected, PUC commissioners are responsible for making a variety of
decisions about utilities, including the placement of necessary infrastructure
and rate setting.216 Though the scope of an individual PUC’s authority is
established by its state legislature,217 all PUC commissioners exercise “both

210. Public Utility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
211. Douglas J. Howe, Governance Models of Public Utility Commissions in the United States,
20 COMPETITION & REGUL. NETWORK INDUS. 229, 229–30 (2019).
212. Id. at 229.
213. Id.; U.S. EPA, AN OVERVIEW OF PUCS FOR STATE ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY
OFFICIALS 1–2 (2010).
214. Water
Systems
Search
Results,
U.S.
EPA,
https://ofmpub.epa.gov/apex/sfdw/f?p=108:103:0::NO:RP (information obtained on June 9, 2020).
Alabama’s rate of private water ownership is 2.946% while Delaware’s is 81.250%. Id. The median
private ownership of water providing organizations in the U.S. is 45.684%. Id. To determine
ownership type, we downloaded the dataset from the website listed above. When downloading the
information, there is an option to add additional columns of data than what is listed on the main
page of the website. A summation of the ownership types by state was then conducted.
215. Howe, supra note 211, at 231.
216. Danielle Sass Byrnett & Daniel Shea, Engagement between Public Utility Commissions and
State
Legislatures,
NAT’L
COUNCIL
ON
ELEC.
POL’Y
1–2
(2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/NCSL_NARUC_Engage_Leg_PUCs_34251.pd
f.
217. Jonathan Armiger, Note, Judicial Review of Public Utility Commissions, 86 IND. L.J. 1163,
1167 (2011) (noting that state legislatures promulgate the statutes that determine the bounds of a
PUC’s legal authority). For example, the Pennsylvania legislature excluded a number of entities
from being considered public utilities under 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (2019), thus removing the
PUC’s authority over those entities.
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legislative and judicial powers.”218 PUCs exercise legislative powers by
promulgating regulations and rules for particular utilities, and they exercise
judicial powers when investigating whether a regulated utility provider has
violated those rules and regulations.219
There are three parties relevant to public utility service: (1) the private
utility provider; (2) the government that regulates the utility; and (3) local
residents who receive services from the private utility provider at rates set by
the local public utility commission. Private utility companies are required to
provide service to all in the area who register and pay to receive service. To
satisfy that obligation and in expectation of future demand for services,
public utility companies purchase and maintain equipment that allow them to
service a given area.220 In exchange for private company provision of utility
service, the state PUC sets utility rates that enable private companies to
receive adequate compensation.221 Compensation is adequate if it is “just and
reasonable.”222 Conversely, compensation that is inadequate can be
construed as “confiscatory”; this can effect a taking.223
Judicial doctrine on confiscatory utility rate setting has evolved over the
last hundred years. In Smyth v. Ames,224 the Supreme Court stated that a
“company is entitled to ask [for] a fair return upon the value of that which it
employs for the public convenience”;225 anything less was confiscatory.226
Nearly fifty years later, the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Power
218. Armiger, supra note 217, at 1165 (quoting In re Request for Serv. in Qwest’s Tofte Exch.,
666 N.W.2d 391, 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 313
(1989) (“[S]tate legislatures are competent bodies to set utility rates. And the [public utility
commission] is essentially an administrative arm of the legislature.”).
219. Armiger, supra note 217, at 1166; The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 433 (1913)
(“The rate-making power is a legislative power and necessarily implies a range of legislative
discretion.”); see also Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 768 (1968) (“A legislative
power to create price ceilings has, in ‘countries where the common law prevails,’ been ‘customary
from time immemorial . . . .’” (citations omitted)).
220. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 198, at 953–54.
221. Id. at 953 (“Without adequate compensation, the utility will not seek to make investments
for expansion or replacement of plant and property and will not be able to raise the necessary
capital. . . . Furthermore, the establishment of formal regulatory proceedings with hearings on the
record by administrative regulatory agencies reflects the constitutional guaranty that the utility
receive due process in ratemaking.”).
222. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601–02 (1944).
223. Rate regulation is only unconstitutional “if the government sets the utility’s charges . . . at
a level that is judicially determined to be unjust and confiscatory.” RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1010–11 (5th ed. 2012); see also Covington &
Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896) (stating that a rate is too low if it is
“so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,”
and “practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due process of law”).
224. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
225. Id. at 547.
226. Richard Goldsmith, Utility Rates and “Takings,” 10 ENERGY L.J. 241, 243 (1989).
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Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.227 replaced Smyth’s “fair value”
standard with a mandate that ratemaking need only be “just and
reasonable.”228 Under Hope, rates are “just and reasonable” if they “enable
the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to
attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed.”229 The
Hope decision is results-oriented. Whether utility rates are “just and
reasonable” is not based on the methodology by which the rate was
computed; instead the focus is on whether the end result balances consumer
and investor interests.230 Value x return determines confiscation.
The Court had the opportunity to reconsider rate methodology in the
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.231 The Court reiterated that PUCs have
freedom to set rates so long as the rate is within a “zone of reasonableness,”
which is determined by examining (1) whether the PUC abused or exceeded
its broad authority; (2) how the PUC employed its methodology and whether
it is “supported by substantial evidence”; and (3) “whether the order may
reasonably be expected to maintain the financial integrity, attract necessary
capital, and fairly compensate investors for the risks they have assumed, and
yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant public interests, both
existing and foreseeable.”232 Taking these factors into consideration, the
zone of reasonableness gives PUCs broad latitude in rate setting methodology
while balancing investor and public interests.
The Court again endorsed “overall impact” analysis in Duquesne Light
Co. v. Barasch.233 In that case, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law prohibiting a utility company from
recovering stranded costs through higher utility rates.234 To recover these
costs, Duquesne petitioned the Pennsylvania Public Utility Company to
increase utility rates, which the commission repeatedly declined.235 The
227. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
228. Id. at 601–02.
229. Id. at 605.
230. Id. at 602.
231. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
232. Id. at 791–92 (“The court’s responsibility is not to supplant the Commission’s balance of
these interests with one more nearly to its liking, but instead to assure itself that the Commission
has given reasoned consideration to each of the pertinent factors.”); id. at 767 (“No other rule would
be consonant with the broad responsibilities given to the Commission by Congress; it must be free,
within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional and statutory commands, to devise
methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling diverse and conflicting interests.”).
233. 488 U.S. 299, 312 (1989).
234. Id. at 303–04. In anticipation of future increase in electricity demands, the Duquesne Light
Company (Duquesne) spent money to build nuclear generating units. Following the 1970s oil
embargo and the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, Duquesne cancelled its plans. At the time
of cancellation, it had spent nearly thirty-five million dollars. Id. at 302.
235. Id. at 303–04. Specifically, Duquesne wanted to amortize its expenditures on the canceled
plants over a ten-year period. The PUC’s rejection of the request was predicated on a section of the
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Court held that the PUC’s rejection of Duquesne’s request did not effect a
Fifth Amendment taking. Reaffirming its decision in Hope, the Court
expressly stated “[i]t is not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unreasonable,
judicial inquiry . . . is at an end.”236 Ultimately, in Duquesne, the Court
looked to the “overall impact” of regulations to determine that the rates were
not “inadequate to compensate current equity holders for the risk associated
with their investments under a modified prudent investment scheme.”237
The Court has expressly recognized that there is “a legitimate concern
with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being
regulated . . . [and] return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital.”238 A public utility taking does not divest owners
from their interest in physical utility assets nor their ownership share in the
company; instead such a taking affects the expected financial returns from
ownership.239 However, utility rates are not confiscatory if there is a
“reasonable rate of return on equity given the risks,”240 and the Constitution
gives broad latitude to states to determine rate setting methodologies that
balance the interests of utility companies and the public.241 Conversely, if
there is not a reasonable rate of return, then a taking has occurred, and the
government is obligated to compensate the private owner for their loss. Just
compensation should leave the affected party in the same economic position
they would be in in the absence of the involuntary taking.242
B. The Contract Clause
The Contract Clause also imposes limitations on the expansion of
positive water rights. This clause prevents states from enacting laws that
Pennsylvania Utility Code that limited “the consideration of certain costs in the rate base.” Id. at
303 (quoting 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1315 (1982)).
236. Id. at 310 (“The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities
is not then important.” (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944))).
237. Id. at 312.
238. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603.
239. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 198, at 993–94.
240. Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 315.
241. Id. at 316.
242. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 198, at 968 (“Compensation for involuntary exchange is ‘just’
when it is equivalent to the compensation that could be derived from voluntary exchange.”)
(emphasis omitted); EPSTEIN, supra note 165, at 182 (“In principle the ideal solution is to leave the
individual owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the government and retention
of the property.”); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“[M]arketvalue standard is a useful and generally sufficient tool for ascertaining the compensation required
to make the owner whole.”).
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affect the terms of pre-existing contracts.243 Like the Takings Clause, the
Contract Clause recognizes the legitimacy and necessity of state police
power, but prohibits the state from taking actions that unduly burden private
parties.244 The threshold question in assessing whether a state has violated
the Contract Clause is “whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a
substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.”245 The Court looks to
several factors when considering whether an impairment is “substantial,”
including (1) the severity of the impairment;246 (2) the magnitude of
destruction of contractual expectations;247 (3) reasonably expected gains
from the pre-existing contract;248 and when applicable, (4) whether the
complaining party’s industry has been previously regulated.249
After finding that the state action is “substantial,” the Court next
considers whether the state has a “significant and legitimate public purpose
behind the regulation.”250 This requirement ensures that the state is truly
exercising its police power and not “providing a benefit to special
interests.”251 If there is a significant and legitimate public purpose, then the
final inquiry is whether the state action furthers an appropriate state
purpose.252 If the challenged regulation “reasonabl[y] and appropriate[ly]”
243. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984); U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”).
244. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (“Although
the language of the Contract Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to
the inherent police power of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of its people.’”) (quoting Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434 (1934)); see also U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977) (“The States must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory
measures without being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a
result. Otherwise, one would be able to obtain immunity from state regulation by making private
contractual arrangements. This principle is summarized in Mr. Justice Holmes’ well-known dictum.
‘One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the
power of the State by making a contract about them.’”) (quoting Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v.
McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908)).
245. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1978) (“The severity of the
impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of
contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage.”).
246. Id.
247. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 459 U.S. at 411 (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 26–27).
248. Id. (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 31); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1012, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (“To establish a contractual relationship subject to the Contract Clause,
the party must demonstrate that the contract gave her a vested interest, not merely an expectation.”).
249. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 242; see also Hudson Cnty. Water Co., 209 U.S. at 357.
250. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 459 U.S. at 411; see also Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245
(“Severe impairment . . . will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of
the state legislation.”).
251. Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 459 U.S. at 412.
252. Id. (citing U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi,
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1462 (2000) (“Under the Contracts
Clause, the state cannot unilaterally void a particular contract unless it pays damages analogous to
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serves “a significant and legitimate public purpose” as compared to the
impairment, then it will not be found to violate the Contract Clause.253 For
example, in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,254 the Supreme
Court held that Minnesota’s two-year mortgage moratorium enacted amid a
widespread economic depression did not violate the Contract Clause because
it was a valid exercise of the State’s police power to promote the general good
of the public.255 More recently, in analyzing whether the City of Los
Angeles’ eviction moratorium, imposed in response to the COVD-19
pandemic, violated the Contract Clause, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit noted that “even if the eviction moratorium was a substantial
impairment of contractual relations, the district court did not err in
determining that the moratorium’s provisions were likely ‘reasonable’ and
‘appropriate’ given the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.”256

those faced by private parties. However, the state can take actions that affect a multitude of
contractual relations without being accused of ‘impairing the obligations of contracts.’”).
253. Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he
Supreme Court has suggested that a sort of sliding scale is appropriate [whereby] . . . the level of
scrutiny given the law varies directly in accordance with the severity of the impairment of existing
contracts, and varies inversely in accordance with the degree of prior regulation in a particular field
of activity.” (citations omitted)); see also Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815, 1821–22 (2018) (stating
that the first issue is whether a state has “operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual
relationship,” and if so, the court must determine whether the law is “reasonable” and “appropriate”)
(first quoting Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244; then quoting Energy Rsrvs. Grp., 459 U.S. at
412).
254. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
255. Id. at 447.
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. . . .
It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the
obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as
are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the
general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between
individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications
is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the
people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.
Id. at 437 (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905)).
256. Apt. Ass’n of L.A. Cnty. v. City of Los Angeles, 10 F.4th 905, 914 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The
City fairly ties the moratorium to its stated goal of preventing displacement from homes, which the
City reasonably explain[ed] can exacerbate the public health-related problems stemming from the
COVID-19 pandemic. . . In turn, each of the provisions of the eviction moratorium that [Plaintiff]
challenge[d] may be viewed as reasonable attempts to address that valid public purpose.” (citations
omitted)). In its own analysis of the national eviction moratorium, the Supreme Court of the United
States limited its analysis to the ability of the CDC to impose such an order, as opposed to Congress.
Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2490 (2021) (“If a
federally imposed eviction moratorium is to continue, Congress must specifically authorize it.”).
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The nature of contract at issue—that is, whether the contract is private
or public—is also important for the Court’s analysis.257 Deference to a
legislature’s assessment of a significant public purpose is appropriate when
considering private contracts.258 However, the same is not true of public
contracts to which the state is a party; by their nature, public contracts affect
the state’s self-interest.259 Given the state’s stake in public contracts, the
Court considers whether there might have been “a less drastic modification,”
or alternative means that did not require modification at all in order to achieve
the state’s goals.260
Perhaps, unsurprisingly, whether the contract terms are express or
implied affects the finding of a Contract Clause violation and subsequent
damages. In United States v. Winstar Corp.,261 the Supreme Court considered
the “enforceability of contracts between the Government and participants in
a regulated industry, to accord them particular regulatory treatment in
exchange for their assumption of liabilities . . . [when] Congress
subsequently changed the relevant law, and thereby barred the Government
from specifically honoring its agreements.”262 A plurality of justices found
that the government had breached a contract with private financial
institutions,263 underscoring the importance of “cost recovery, incentive for
257. See generally U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
258. Id. at 25–26.
As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment [of a public
contract] may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important
public purpose. In applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s selfinterest is at stake.
Id.; see also Energy Rsrvs. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13 (1983)
(“Unless the State itself is a contracting party . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment.”)
(citation omitted) (quoting U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 23).
259. U.S. Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25–26. For example, “[i]f a State could reduce its financial
obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public
purpose, the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.” Id. at 26.
260. Id. at 30–31 (“[A] State is not completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its
own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives. Similarly, a State is not free to impose a
drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally
well.”)
261. 518 U.S. 839, 843 (1996) (plurality opinion) (holding that the U.S. government could be in
breach of contract after encouraging healthy thrifts to merge with failing thrifts when subsequent
legislation eliminated financial benefits for healthy thrifts).
262. Id. at 843. In Winstar, three financial institutions sued the United States for breach of
contract after the government had previously encouraged the banks to take over “ailing institutions
in a series of ‘supervisory mergers.’” Id. at 847, 858. Healthy banks were induced to take over
ailing financial institutions by the government’s promise to engage in certain accounting practices.
Id. at 845–46. Congress’s subsequent enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 eliminated these practices, and penalized the banks. Id. at 856–58.
263. Id. at 843. Winstar has an interesting holding due to the fact that three opinions claim to
represent the seven-person majority: Justice Souter authored the main opinion, joined by Justices
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investment, opportunism, and the government’s need to make credible
commitments.”264 Some scholars argue these elements of the Winstar
holding demonstrate “the rights and remedies of public utilities under their
regulatory contracts with municipalities.”265
In Winstar, Justice Souter expressly noted that there exist “special rules,
not generally applicable to private contracts [that] govern enforcement of the
governmental contracts.”266 These include: (1) surrenders of sovereign
authority must be made in unmistakable terms; (2) the surrender of sovereign
authority must be done in express terms; (3) the government may not contract
away certain reserved powers; and (4) a government’s sovereign acts may
not serve as the basis for a breach of contract claim.267 However, despite
these “special rules,” when Congress changed the relevant law, “the
Government was unable to perform its promise and, therefore, became liable
for breach.”268 Notably, Justice Souter wrote that the application of the
unmistakability doctrine to all contracts “would place the doctrine at odds
with the Government’s own long-run interest as a reliable contracting partner
in the myriad workaday transaction of its agencies.”269 Ultimately, Winstar
endorsed the finding of the lower courts, that in entering the contract at issue,
“the Government agreed to do something that did not implicate its sovereign
powers at all,” and, as a result, “the Federal Circuit correctly refused to apply
the unmistakability doctrine.”270 In doing so, the case “reaffirmed the
unmistakability doctrine—that promises by the government to forgo certain
types of future regulatory action will be enforced by courts only if these are

Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer; Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence; Justice Scalia wrote an opinion
joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, who concurred in the judgement, but not the reasoning of
Justice Souter’s opinion; Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the dissent, joined by Justice Ginsburg.
Id. at 843, 910, 919, 924.
264. J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of ForwardLooking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1152 (1997).
265. See id.
266. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 870.
269. Id. at 883; see also id. at 871 (“The question, then, is not whether Congress could be
constrained but whether the doctrine of unmistakability is applicable to any contract claim against
the Government for breach occasioned by a subsequent Act of Congress. The answer to this
question is no.”) (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 886–87 (“[The dissent’s] failure to advance any limiting principle at all would
effectively compromise the Government’s capacity as a reliable, straightforward contractor
whenever the subject matter of a contract might be subject to subsequent regulation, which is most
if not all of the time. Since the facts of the present case demonstrate that the Government may wish
to further its regulatory goals through contract, we are unwilling to adopt any rule of construction
that would weaken the Government’s capacity to do business by converting every contract it makes
into an arena for unmistakability litigation.”).
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set forth in unmistakably unambiguous language, which a plaintiff bears the
burden of proving.”271
Likewise, a history of regulation does not effect a contract between
parties. The Supreme Court has continually maintained “that absent some
clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the
presumption is that ‘a law is not intended to create private contractual or
vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature
shall ordain otherwise.’”272 Put simply, prior legislation does not bind
subsequent regulations.
C. Permissible Pandemic Police Powers
Tellingly, in response to COVID-19 water disconnection moratoria,
utility companies did not attempt to advance claims that the moratoria went
“too far” under Penn Central, effected a confiscatory rate setting, or
functioned as impermissible contract impairment. This is thanks largely to
the fact that the moratoria were an exercise of the government’s police power
to protect health, safety, and welfare. At the same time, the moratoria never
eliminated consumer obligations to repay. Moreover, the Takings Clause
only requires compensation when the government takes private property for
public use.273 In many jurisdictions,274 water utilities are publicly controlled
and operated. As such, these utility providers were ineligible to advance a
claim under the Takings Clause. While private utility companies would meet
the threshold criteria to allege a violation of the Fifth Amendment, they chose
not to, perhaps knowing that they were unlikely to succeed. The applicable
legal framework to determine whether water utility disconnection moratoria
effect a taking turns on whether one views the moratoria as (1) a regulation

271. Rose-Ackerman & Rossi, supra note 252, at 1463–64 (emphasis omitted); id. at 1464
(“Classic cases, such as Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, in which the Court refused to imply
a protection against new competitors for a chartered bridge, advise against recovery.”) (footnote
omitted).
272. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465–
66 (1985) (citing Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937)).
273. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
274. SDWIS Federal Reports Search, supra note 159. According to the Safe Drinking Water
Information System (“SDWIS”), of the 49,011 water-providing organizations in the United States,
25,499 are publicly controlled and operated (there are an additional 1,208 organizations that are
jointly controlled and operated by public and private entities). Id. For reference, the SDWIS
classifies public water-providing organizations as those that are owned by the federal government,
state governments, local governments, and Native American tribes. Owner type does not initially
show up when a search is run on all water districts. To access this information, run a search on all
districts (you do not need to change any of the initial search settings). Then, you will need to include
owner type in the columns listed by selecting “Select Columns” on the top right side of the screen
and moving “Owner Type” from “Do Not Display” to “Display in Report.”
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that goes “too far” to deprive the public utility owners of their property’s
economic use; or (2) an act of the PUC to set water utility rates at zero dollars.
A utility company would not prevail on a claim that disconnection
moratoria go “too far” in depriving utility owners of the economic use of their
property. Because water disconnection moratoria do not involve a physical
invasion of property or a 100% diminution of use or value, addressing this
claim necessitates the application of the Penn Central factors. Under this
framework, the court largely considers the economic impact on the property
owner.275 A utility company may claim that the water disconnection
moratorium functioned to force distribution of a commodity without
compensation. This reasoning is flawed. The moratorium does not eliminate
the obligation of utility consumers to pay for water services. Many
consumers are continuing to pay for water as it is supplied during the
pandemic and state of emergency. Even among consumers that stopped
paying for services due to financial hardship, there is still an obligation to
repay the utility company after the expiration of the moratorium.276 The
obligation to repay ensures the utility company will still realize the economic
benefit of its property. Moreover, consumers will have a strong incentive to
pay for outstanding services after the moratoria expire, as failure to repay will
result in future termination of water services. In many instances, after utility
services are disconnected, the account will not be reconnected, even at a new
address, until the outstanding amount is repaid. Moreover, given that
“diminutions in value approaching 85 to 90 percent do not necessarily dictate
the existence of a taking,”277 it is unlikely that the financial losses will be
substantial enough to effect a taking under the Penn Central analysis. Utility
companies may make an argument that the duration of the moratoria supports
the finding of a taking. At the time of collection of moratoria data in early
summer 2020, no moratorium included language that it would be in effect

275. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
276. See, e.g., N.H. Emergency Order #3 Pursuant to Executive Order 2020-04 para. 3 (Mar. 17,
2020). The State of New Hampshire’s moratorium states:
At the end of the State of Emergency, customers having arrearages accrued during the
State of Emergency shall be provided the opportunity to make a reasonable payment
arrangement over no less than a six-month period and shall not be charged any fees for
late payment for arrearages accrued during the State of Emergency.
Id.
277. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 357 (2006). While this case was not analyzed under
the Penn Central factors, it is noteworthy that “the Supreme Court held that a diminution of 93.7
percent did not constitute a categorical taking.” Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1027–31 (1992)). See id. at 357 n.31 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926) (no taking despite 75% diminution); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(no taking despite 87.5% diminution)).
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longer than eight months,278 falling short of the twelve months that the Court
in Tahoe-Sierra found to give rise to “skepticism.”279
Expanding access to water through disconnection moratoria is also
subject to judicial limitations on confiscatory rate setting, as the moratoria
may be considered an act by the PUC to set water utility rates at zero dollars,
at least for certain customers. Providing access to water by enacting water
utility disconnection moratoria did not change how a utility provider used its
water rights. Nothing about the disconnection moratoria required a utility
provider to change its operation; there was no change to how it was extracting
or distributing water. Rather, the moratoria only changed when the utility
provider was compensated. Viewed through this lens, the Court’s analytical
framework in Duquesne applies. Duquesne urges the Court to evaluate how
the rate at issue affects a utility company’s return on investment.280 To
demonstrate an unreasonable return on investment, a utility company may
point to its financial losses incurred by continuing to provide water services
that, but for the moratorium, would have been disconnected. This includes
not only the cost of providing water itself, but also infrastructure costs
associated with managing a water utility system. Though utility companies
experienced financial losses during the pandemic, the unreasonable return
argument fails for two reasons. First, the moratoria were temporary; utility
companies were not forced to indefinitely use their water property interests
to distribute a resource without compensation. Second, the moratoria did not
eliminate consumers’ obligation to pay for services; moratoria only delayed
payment. Since the utility companies will be paid after the expiration of the
moratoria, investors will eventually receive a reasonable rate of return.
Water utility disconnection moratoria are likewise limited by the bounds
of the Contract Clause. The moratoria affected three parties: (1) the utility
provider; (2) the utility consumer; and (3) the PUC, a state actor. Between
these parties, there are two contracts at issue. The first exists between the
utility provider and the utility consumer. The second concerns the utility
provider and the PUC. Utility consumers enter into an agreement with a
utility provider.281 In areas with private utility providers, the contract

278. California’s moratorium was enacted on April 2, 2020, and was not set to expire until the
end of 2020. The moratorium was extended until June 30, 2021.
Cal.
Exec.
Ord.
N-42-20
(Apr.
2,
2020),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/4.2.20-EO-N-42-20.pdf.
279. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341–42 (2002)
(“[But] we could not possibly conclude that every delay of over one year is constitutionally
unacceptable.”).
280. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989).
281. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 198, at 879 (“Consumers and businesses voluntarily participate
in a market transaction only if they receive gains from trade—that is, only if the transaction yields
positive net benefits for them”) (emphasis omitted).
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between the parties is private. Alternatively, if the water is provided by the
local jurisdiction,282 then the agreement is a public contract. As discussed
above, when a contract is public, the court considers additional factors to
determine whether state action substantially impairs the agreement such that
it violates the Contract Clause.283 In exchange for the provision of water, the
consumer agrees to remit payment to the utility provider. These service
agreements generally include provisions that detail the circumstances under
which the utility company will terminate service, such as nonpayment by the
consumer.
In thirty-three jurisdictions, water disconnection moratoria prevented
utility companies from exercising their contractual rights under a standard
termination clause.284 Whether the moratorium is substantial, however,
would depend on the losses incurred by the utility provider for
uncompensated water services. None of the moratoria eliminated the
consumer’s obligation to repay the provider for services; instead, the
consumer was merely given additional time to compensate the utility
company.285 Few moratoria specified the duration of the repayment period.
Ten states included language urging a “reasonable” or “flexible” repayment
plan.286 Only three—North Carolina, New Hampshire, and Alaska—
included specific time provisions; in North Carolina and New Hampshire the
repayment period could not be shorter than six months, while Alaska’s
moratorium mandated that the repayment not be shorter than the duration of
the COVID-19 state of emergency. However, for example, the government
of the State of Michigan demonstrated that it was acting pursuant to its police
power to further a legitimate public interest: the moratorium functioned to
ensure access to essential water services to residents during a pandemic.287
The jurisdictions that adopted water disconnection moratoria did so against
the backdrop of a pandemic, with record unemployment being the factor most
strongly correlated with the enactment of moratoria.288 Given the importance
of handwashing to prevent the transmission of, and infection from, COVID282. See, e.g., BIRMINGHAM WATER WORKS, www.bwwb.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
283. See supra notes 245–249 and accompanying text.
284. State Response Tracker, supra note 134.
285. See, e.g., supra note 276.
286. These states include Connecticut, Hawaii, Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Rhode Island,
Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and New York. As an example, Hawaii stated: “Utilities should
strongly consider offering payment plans or other reasonable arrangements to customers once the
suspension of disconnections or terminations of service are lifted.” Haw. Pub. Utils. Comm’n
Order No. 37,284 para. 2 (Aug. 24, 2020).
287. See, e.g., Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-28 (Mar. 30, 2020), repealed by Mich. Exec. Order
No. 2020-144 (July 8, 2020) (“To mitigate the spread of COVID-19, protect the public health, and
avoid needless deaths, it is crucial that all Michiganders remain in their homes or residences to the
greatest extent possible and wash their hands thoroughly and regularly.”).
288. See supra Section II.B.
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19, the government can not only establish that it had a legitimate public
purpose, but as in Blaisdell, that the action is appropriate to address the
need.289
In addition to its contract with the utility consumer, there also exists a
relationship between the utility provider and the public utility commission.
This is generally not a written agreement, but rather a regulatory contract.
Professors Sidak and Spulber state that there are three components of a
regulatory contract: (1) entry controls; (2) rate regulation; and (3) utility
service obligations.290 In exchange for tightly controlled entry into the utility
market by the PUC and the opportunity for investors to “earn a fair rate of
return on their investments,” the utility company complies with regulations
governing its operations and pricing.291 Disconnection moratoria raise the
question of whether there is impermissible interference with utility investors’
opportunity to earn a “fair” rate of return. In the unique circumstances
created by the pandemic, that answer is no. The moratoria were quickly and
successfully implemented because they did not exceed constitutional bounds.
The following Part discusses what lessons the moratoria teach about
expanding a positive right to water going forward.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO EXPAND WATER ACCESS
In addition to temporarily expanding access to water, the moratoria
provide insight into the circumstances favorable to achieving positive water
rights in the United States. As COVID-19 demonstrated, preparation before
catastrophe strikes can lessen its impact and aid in recovery. Or, to
paraphrase the late Justice Ginsburg, to avoid getting wet, your umbrella
should be up before the rainstorm begins.292 Across America, disaster
planners invest in culverts and levees to protect people from floods and
hurricanes, or put sprinklers in buildings in case of fires.293 These
investments are a necessary expense, not to prevent disasters altogether, but
to mitigate their damage. That investment in mitigation, made before the
disaster begins, leads to faster cleanup and lower economic recovery costs.
Likewise, actions that shift the United States toward positive water rights are
a disaster mitigation investment. Sustainable, broad access to clean water is

289. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447 (1934).
290. For a detailed overview of the regulatory contract, see Sidak & Spulber, supra note 198, at
907–16.
291. Id. at 908.
292. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 590 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Throwing
out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is
like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”).
293. Robert H. Jerry, II, Managing Hurricane (and Other Natural Disaster) Risk, 6 TEX. A&M
L. REV. 391, 407–12 (2018).
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an insurance policy against disasters made worse by a lack of water access,
like drought, fire, or even another pandemic.
The Virginia General Assembly is making policy changes in response
to issues raised by the pandemic. Like many other states, Virginia faced an
avalanche of economic issues in the first quarter of 2020: the state
experienced a decrease in its labor force participation rate between January
and April, 2020; a decrease in its employment-population ratio during that
same interval; and a spike in unemployment of over 400%, with
unemployment rates increasing from 2.7% in January to 11.2% by April.294
The deteriorating economic conditions created a pretext for increasing access
to water even after the pandemic. In the 2021 legislative session, the Virginia
House of Delegates introduced a resolution recognizing that access to clean,
potable, and affordable water is a necessary human right.295 Though the
resolution does not create a private right of action, it evidences the realization
that the state must take a proactive role to provide water access and serves as
a foundation for future laws that effect a positive right to water.
The moratoria were modest measures that successfully expanded water
access during a public health and unemployment crisis. These events suggest
that future work to expand a positive right to water will be most successful
when there is a clear nexus between water access, community health
outcomes, and economic hardship. The following proposals are a starting
point for policymakers to incorporate the lessons learned from the pandemic
data to advance positive water rights beyond the pandemic.
A. Increase Funding for Vulnerable Households
First and foremost, policymakers should increase funding opportunities
for low-income residents to pay for utility access. There is no way to expand
access to water without someone incurring the cost. Prior to the pandemic,
the cost was largely placed on the individual consumer. The water utility
moratoria temporarily upended the status quo, placing the burden temporarily
on water utility providers. Had the moratoria permanently suspended the
obligation of consumers to repay, then the government would have been
constitutionally responsible for compensating utility providers for their
losses.296 Moving forward, the government should expand existing programs
to provide financial resources to increase reliable access to water. All
jurisdictions already participate in the Low Income Household Energy

294. Local
Area
Unemployment
Statistics,
U.S.
BUREAU
LAB.
STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST510000000000003?amp%253bdata_tool=XGtable&output_
view=data&include_graphs=true (last visited Oct. 22, 2021) (data extracted on Feb. 18, 2021).
295. H.J. Res. 538, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021).
296. See supra Section III.A.
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Assistance Program (LIHEAP).297 An outgrowth of the Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Act of 1981,298 LIHEAP provides grants to states “to assist
low-income households . . . primarily in meeting their immediate home
energy needs.”299 States applying for these grants must certify that the state
will use the grant to help low-income households meet their energy costs and
intervene during energy crises.300 The Act also provides stipulations about
the income levels of consumers.301 Additionally, there are state programs
available that supplement federal programs like LIHEAP. These programs
subsidize low-income households with rates imposed on high-income
consumers.302 While LIHEAP is a needed program that helps millions,
COVID-19 has illustrated that the program must be improved upon and
expanded.
LIHEAP defines “home energy” as “a source of heating or cooling in
residential dwellings.”303 This definition excludes water, preventing lowincome families from using LIHEAP to gain access to this critical resource.
At the federal level, Congress can take action to expand the definition of
“home energy” to include water, or grant a temporary exception for the use
of LIHEAP funds to be used toward water utilities in the event of a pandemic
or national crisis. Failing that, the federal government, or even states, can
create an analogous program to address water accessibility. Indeed, many
jurisdictions operate water utility hardship programs, under which
households that have experienced a crisis or extenuating circumstances can
apply for water payment assistance.304 The COVID-19 crisis makes clear

297. For an in-depth discussion of LIHEAP and other energy assistance programs, see Benjamin
P. Mayers, Article, Low Income Household Energy Assistance Program: Working to Ensure
Protection for the Future, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 309, 309–14 (2017); Adrienne L.
Thompson, Protecting Low-Income Ratepayers as the Electricity System Evolves, 37 ENERGY L.J.
265, 270–78 (2016).
298. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8621–30.
299. Id. § 8621(a).
300. Id. § 8624(b)(1)(A)–(D). The statute also provides that states must use the funds to
“conduct outreach activities and provide assistance to low income households in meeting
their home energy costs, particularly those with the lowest incomes that pay a high proportion
of household income for home energy” and “provide low-cost residential weatherization and other
cost-effective energy-related home repair.” Id. § 8624(b)(1)(A), (C).
301. Id. § 8624(b)(2)(A)–(B).
302. Thompson, supra note 297, at 285–99 (explaining, in depth, different legislative schemes
for expanding budgets for ratepayer assistance programs). In one example, low-income ratepayer
financial assistance is funded by adding small surcharges to non-low-income customers’ bills. Id.
at 286–87.
303. 42 U.S.C. § 8622(6).
304. See, e.g., Joseph Bamat, Get Water Bill Help When Facing a “Special Hardship,” CITY OF
PHILA. DEP’T OF REVENUE (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.phila.gov/2019-02-26-get-water-bill-helpwhen-facing-a-special-hardship/. In the City of Philadelphia, low-income households, senior
citizens, and residents experiencing a “special hardship” can receive temporary financial assistance.
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that access to water is just as essential as access to heat. As such, including
water in the existing program is consistent with the underlying purpose and
reasoning of LIHEAP.
The recent passage of both the Consolidated Appropriations Act and the
American Rescue Plan Act created the Low Income Household Water
Assistance Program (LIHWAP), an emergency program to expand water
access.305 Together, these Acts provided over $1.1 billion in funding to
support emergency water accessibility by awarding grants to states,
territories, and eligible Native American Tribes to assist low-income families
in need of drinking and sanitation water services.306 The grants can be used
to pay the owners or operators of water systems in order to either decrease
rates charged to low-income households, or assist in lowering past-due
balances on water service bills.307 Like LIHEAP, this program is incomebased, with grantees including states, territories, and Tribes making decisions
about eligibility criteria.308 These Acts also created the Emergency Rental
Assistance Program (ERAP).309 A temporary program for emergency
assistance, ERAP provides funding to families to pay rent or utilities,
including water utility payments. Due to limited funding and grantee
prioritization, many households may not receive assistance. Increasing
funding for these programs, as well as expanding eligibility requirements,
and crucially, making them permanent, will increase water access going
forward.

Special hardships include: changes in household composition, job loss, serious illness, family loss,
domestic violence, and changes to household expenses. Id.
305. Lanikque Howard, Water is Life: Spotlighting OCS’ New Emergency Water Assistance
Program,
ADMIN.
FOR
CHILDREN
&
FAMILIES
(Mar.
23,
2021),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/blog/2021/03/spotlighting-ocs-new-emergency-water-assistanceprogram; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 533, 134 Stat. 1474;
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117-2, § 2912, 135 Stat. 51 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
9058b).
306. See supra note 305.
307. See supra note 305.
308. See, e.g., New Low-Income Household Water Assistance Program to Launch in October,
MESKWAKI NATION, https://www.meskwaki.org/new-low-income-household-water-assistanceprogram-to-launch-in-october/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) (eligible households must have an income
at or below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines); Colorado Low-income Energy Assistance
Program (LEAP), COLORADO DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS. (last visited Jan. 3, 2022),
https://cdhs.colorado.gov/leap (eligible households must not exceed 60% of the state median
income level); Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), TENN. HOUS. DEV.
AGENCY, https://thda.org/help-for-homeowners/energy-assistance-programs/low-income-homeenergy-assistance-program-liheap (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) (eligible households must not exceed
60% of the state median income level in model plan).
309. See Emergency Rental Assistance Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribalgovernments/emergency-rental-assistance-program (last visited Feb. 25, 2022).
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B. Temporary Rate Decrease
Given the connection between unemployment and the likelihood of a
jurisdiction enacting a water utility moratorium, PUCs could implement
economic triggers that function to automatically decrease rates should the
two events simultaneously occur in the future. For example, in the event of
a future recession, when residents will have to make difficult choices about
what expenses to prioritize, PUCs could decrease rates for eighteen months,
or until their state’s unemployment numbers return to below a certain
percentage. These rate decreases would shift some economic pain from
utility consumers to utility providers, but still provide utility companies with
some financial compensation. Under a moratorium, some utility consumers
are temporarily relieved from paying, while others continue their scheduled
payments, meaning that utility providers receive less compensation overall.
Rate decreases across-the-board increase the likelihood that a greater number
of utility consumers will be able to make payments while eliminating the
need for utility companies to place some accounts in forbearance, thereby
decreasing the likelihood of repayment. Considering economic benchmarks
before the next crisis encourages state and local governments to anticipate
resident needs and become better situated to handle future economic
shockwaves.
Critics of this proposal may point out that it could benefit those who are
not struggling economically during a crisis. For example, not everyone was
financially affected by the pandemic. While this could be implemented as a
regressive policy—i.e., only available to consumers in a particular
socioeconomic group—administrative burdens compel across-the-board
action. Utility providers do not regularly collect information about
consumers’ finances. Therefore, implementing a regressive policy would
require utility companies to establish and operate new processes to determine
which consumers qualify. Even if utility companies required consumers to
submit application materials to receive this benefit, there would still be heavy
administrative costs shouldered by companies and delays for consumers at
times of crisis.
This policy is consistent with the broad latitude afforded to PUCs in
utility rate-setting. As discussed in Part III, PUCs have the authority to set
rates within a “zone of reasonableness” that considers several factors,
including “provid[ing] appropriate protection to the relevant public interests,
both existing and foreseeable.”310 Here, the relevant public interest is making
sure that financially vulnerable residents have continued water access,
thereby helping to protect household and community health and safety.
310. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770, 792 (1968); see supra notes 231–232
and accompanying text.
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Utility rates are not confiscatory when there is a “reasonable rate of return on
equity given the risks.”311 Because the Supreme Court gives PUCs such wide
latitude in setting rates, each state can conduct a financial analysis to
determine the appropriate decrease for its jurisdiction. Rates around the
country are not uniform, so it follows that the rate decreases under this policy
would not be uniform either. Additionally, some states like Pennsylvania312
provide a hard limit on the amount that temporary rates can be reduced,
further protecting utility providers from takings under this policy.313
C. Reconnect Water Services for Vulnerable Populations
In times of crisis, PUCs should require utilities to reconnect water utility
services to vulnerable residents who were previously disconnected. This is
consistent with existing laws and policies to prevent utility disconnections in
conditions that threaten health and safety, even if an account has an
outstanding balance. For example, forty states have enacted regulations that
ban utility companies from disconnecting essential services—electricity or
gas—for heating or cooling purposes during extreme weather.314 These states
take a variety of approaches to determine which households are eligible.
Some, like Alabama,315 center their policies around a temperature threshold,
while others, like Connecticut,316 limit utility disconnection during certain
times of the year. Delaware typifies a third approach, taking both

311. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989); see supra notes 233–237 and
accompanying text.
312. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1310(a) (2020) (stating that temporary rates “shall be sufficient to
provide a return of not less than 5% upon the original cost, less accrued depreciation, of the physical
property, when first devoted to public use, of such public utility”). This rate limit is triggered by
the PUC’s decision to temporarily decrease or increase rates based on the public interest. Id.
313. Moreover, statutory authority to temporarily adjust rates in the public interest exists around
the country. See, e.g., 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1310(a) (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378:27
(2021); 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 39-3-13 (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 269-16(b)(1) (2017).
314. State Disconnection Policies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.,
https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/Disconnect/disconnect.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
315. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 770-X-1-.12(2)(e) (2021) (stating that “[n]o residential electric or
natural gas service shall be disconnected for nonpayment when the temperature at that location is
forecasted to be 32 degrees Fahrenheit or below for that calendar day”).
316. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-262c(b)(1) (2020) (stating that “[f]rom November first to May
first, inclusive, no electric distribution company, as defined in section 16-1, no electric supplier and
no municipal utility furnishing electricity shall terminate, deny or refuse to reinstate residential
electric service in hardship cases where the customer lacks the financial resources to pay his or her
entire account. From November first to May first, inclusive, no gas company and no municipal
utility furnishing gas shall terminate, deny or refuse to reinstate residential gas service in hardship
cases where the customer uses such gas for heat and lacks the financial resources to pay his or her
entire account” with a limited exception for gas companies in cases where this statute was used the
previous year, and payment still has not been rendered).
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temperature and time of year into account.317 Finally, others like Idaho base
their policies around protecting vulnerable populations, such as children
under the age of eighteen, or elderly or infirm adults.318 These policies are
predicated on the acknowledgment that under certain conditions, some
utilities are so essential to life and health that people cannot go without them.
Recently, of the thirty-three states that enacted disconnection moratoria, only
a few also mandated reconnection of previously terminated services.319
Some, like the City of Los Angeles, took further steps to provide water access
to persons experiencing homelessness by setting up free handwashing
stations on city streets.320 For the two million people living in America who
lacked water access even prior to the pandemic,321 reconnection is essential.
Requiring PUCs to reconnect all water utility services merges the logic
of weather-related utility disconnection bans with the realities of water
necessity underscored by the COVID-19 pandemic. Handwashing and
proper sanitation are critical to preventing the spread of diseases like
COVID-19. Policymakers have recognized the critical need for heating and
cooling; water must be included in these considerations to protect individual
and community health. Further, in recognition of the threat to health posed
by lack of water, policymakers must also take affirmative steps to reconnect
services for those who were previously disconnected. Coupling this proposal
with the recommendation to increase funding will expand access to water,
while at the same time providing compensation to utility providers.
At their core, these proposals encourage community resilience in the
face of catastrophe, both during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond.
Americans will always need water, and as in the past, the United States will
endure events that strain or disrupt water access. The nature of those
events—civil unrest, natural disasters, or economic upheaval—are
unpredictable, but water vulnerability is not. By investing in water access
317. 26 DEL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 3000-2.0, 3000-6.1 (2018) (stating that the cooling season is
between June 1 and September 30, and the heating season is between November 15 and March 31.
During the cooling season, utility service cannot be terminated if a residence is within 50 miles of
an area with a heat index equal to or above 105°F, and during the heating season, the same is true
for temperatures equal to or below 32°F).
318. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 31.21.01.306.01 (2020) (stating that “[e]xcept as provided in Rule
303, no gas or electric utility may terminate service or threaten to terminate service during the
months of December through February to any residential customer who declares that he or she is
unable to pay in full for utility service . . . and whose primary household includes children [18 or
younger], elderly [62 or older] or infirm persons”).
319. See, e.g., Mich. Exec. Order No. 2020-28 (Mar. 30, 2020), repealed by Mich. Exec. Order
No. 2020-144 (July 8, 2020).
320. James Queally, ‘She hadn’t Showered in Nine Days.’ L.A. Makes it Hard to be Homeless,
Avoid Coronavirus, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/homelesshousing/story/2020-03-29/coronavirus-homeless-wash-hands-hygiene-los-angeles-shutdownshower-of-hope.
321. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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expansion on the front end, policymakers take one major concern off of their
plates before the crisis begins.
CONCLUSION
At the federal level, the United States does not guarantee a right to
water. Instead, the federal government operates a pay-to-play scheme that
hinges on individual consumers’ ability to pay for access to a critical
resource. The system is administered under a hodgepodge of state
regulations, leaving millions of people behind in the process. But water
access in the United States does not have to be this way; when faced with a
public health crisis and historic levels of unemployment, the majority of
states quickly enacted water utility disconnection moratoria. These moratoria
prevented water utility providers from terminating services to consumers,
regardless of ability to pay. In doing so, they disrupted existing contracts
between consumers, service providers, and public utility commissions,
creating a de facto positive right to water in a time of public need. While the
moratoria did not exceed the bounds imposed by the Constitution’s Takings
and Contract Clauses, they illuminated the tension between expanding
positive water rights and constitutional limitations on government
interference with private property.
This Article’s analysis of water utility disconnection moratoria data
found that a state’s unemployment rate was the factor most closely correlated
with moratorium adoption, signifying that mitigating widespread
unemployment provokes state action. But it should not take large-scale
societal disruption amidst a global pandemic for governments to act. The
COVID-19 pandemic provided an opportunity for federal and state
governments to reevaluate the United States’ approach to water, and take
measures to ensure that all have access to this critical resource going forward.
The pandemic was a wake-up call to water access issues for many Americans;
for people in Flint, Lowndes County, rural California, and Appalachia, the
nation’s collective awakening—and the need for government action—is long
overdue.

